MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Elena Rodriguez-Malfavon (Plaintiff) appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants Clark County School District (CCSD), Edward Goldman, and Anita Wilbur (collectively, Defendants) on her First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this disposition.

First Amendment retaliation claims are governed by the five-step framework outlined in Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009). The Eng factors inquire:

Id. at 1070 . If the plaintiff successfully meets her burden on the first three factors, the burden shifts to the defendants on the last two. See id. at 1070-72 .

The fifth factor allows a defendant to “avoid liability by showing that the employee’s protected speech was not a but-for cause of the adverse employment action.” Id. at 1072 . We have emphasized that “[ijmmunity should be granted on this ground only if the state successfully alleges, without dispute by the plaintiff, that it would have made the same employment decisions even absent the questioned speech.” Id. (emphasis added). The but-for causation inquiry is a question of fact. Id.

Here, the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of the fifth Eng factor. In opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff proffered an affidavit disputing several of the bases of the second unsatisfactory evaluation she received from Wilbur. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and mindful that Defendants bear the burden of proof on the issue of but-for causation, we conclude that Plaintiffs evidence created a genuine issue of material fact on the fifth Eng factor.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. . Because the district court relied solely on the fifth Eng factor in granting summary judgment, we limit our discussion to the fifth factor and express no view on the merits of the remaining factors. See Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2009).