Gustavo A. Saballo-Cortez (Saballo-Cortez) appeals from the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his application for withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) and for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a). 1

I

Issues On Appeal

Saballo-Cortez raises the following issues in his brief filed with this court.

One. The immigration judge and the BIA should have applied the burden of proof set forth in Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1982), rev’d, INS v. Stevic, — *1356 U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2489 , 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984).

Two. The denial of his application was not supported by substantial evidence.

Three. The immigration judge violated his right to counsel, due process and equal protection by failing to inform counsel that he had taken possession of a copy of an arrest warrant and had requested a police and security check from the American Embassy in Managua.

II

Discussion

A. Burden of Proof

Saballo-Cortez argued in his brief that the immigration judge and the BIA should have applied the standard of proof adopted in Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1982), rev’d, INS v. Stevic, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2489 , 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984), in reviewing his “subjective evidence” of a well-founded fear of persecution. In Stevic, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen his deportation proceedings based on a claim of persecution under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h). The BIA denied the motion on the ground that Stevic had failed to present a claim containing a prima facie showing of “a clear probability of persecution directed at the individual respondent.” Ste vic v. Sava, 678 F.2d at 403-04 . The court of appeals in Stevic reversed the BIA’s denial of the motion holding that it was based on a legal test which was no longer the law. Id. at 409.

After the briefs were filed in the present matter, the Supreme Court issued its opinion reversing the Second Circuit’s decision in Stevic v. Sava. INS v. Stevic, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2489 , 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). The Court held that “an alien must establish a clear probability of persecution to avoid deportation under § 243(h)” — U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 2489 . The Court concluded that the clear probability standard “requires that an application be supported by evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution on one of the specified grounds.” — U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 2501 . Thus, Saballo-Cortez’s contention that the immigration judge and the BIA were required to follow Stevic v. Sava is no longer tenable with respect to his application for withholding of deportation in light of the Supreme Court’s express holding in INS v. Stevic. To the extent that the clear probability of persecution test was applied in this matter to the application for withholding of deportation, no error occurred.

B. The Standard of Proof For Asylum Claims

The Supreme Court declined to decide the meaning of the phrase “well-founded fear of persecution” which is made applicable by the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act and regulations to requests for discretionary asylum since that issue was not presented in INS v. Stevic, — U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 2501 . Because the instant case turns on whether Saballo-Cortez met his burden of persuading the immigration judge and the BIA that his testimony was credible, we need not determine the proper, standard of proof necessary to make a prima facie showing of a well-founded fear of persecution under Saballo-Cortez’s claim for asylum. We note that the BIA found that Saballo-Cortez failed to meet his burden of proof “whether his claim is assessed in terms of whether he has demonstrated ‘clear probability,’ ‘good reason,’ or ‘realistic likelihood' of persecution.” Thus, we cannot say on this record that the BIA improperly applied the clear probability of persecution standard, as claimed by Saballo-Cortez.

C. Did Saballo-Cortez Meet His Burden of Persuasion?

A petitioner seeking withholding of deportation and asylum must first present sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case that there is a clear probability of persecution as to his 1253(h) claim and a well-founded fear of persecution under the *1357 discretionary 1158(a) claim. Secondly, he must persuade the immigration judge and the BIA that his evidence is credible.

The immigration judge and the BIA were not persuaded that Saballo-Cortez was a credible witness. We must decide if that finding was substantially supported by the evidence in the record. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316-1317 (9th Cir.1981). If the record supports the BIA’s finding that the testimony was not credible, then Saballo-Cortez has failed to present substantial evidence to compel a mandatory withholding of deportation. Where the facts presented are not credible, it is also not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny asylum. 2

D. Pertinent Facts

The immigration judge and the BIA made their determination that Saballo-Cor-tez’s testimony was not truthful based on a review of the facts set forth in his application and his testimony.

1. The Application.

In a sworn application, signed under penalty of perjury, Saballo-Cortez recited the following facts:

When shown his sworn application at the hearing during cross-examination, Saballo-Cortez replied that he could not read English. The application is in English.

When asked if the application was accurate in stating that he passed through Honduras, El Savador, and Guatemala, Saballo-Cortez replied that there were mistakes in the answers set forth therein.

2. Saballo-Cortez’s Testimony

On direct examination, Saballo-Cortez testified as follows. He does not wish to return to Nicaragua because “over there I feel I am persecuted by the Sandinista *1358 army.” They have threatened him “many times.” “They have taken my rights away from me to work in my country” because he did not want to serve in the military.

When asked to describe the threats, Sa-ballo-Cortez replied that he was threatened “about two times.” In January, 1982 he was threatened by a man whose name he did not know, but his nickname is “Cay-pal.” He claimed that Caypal “took over the security of the state.” Caypal told him that he would be found dead in a field with his eyes “full of ants” because of his refusal to serve in the military or join the neighborhood of Sandinistas.

In October of 1982, he was threatened again by the same man with “the same threat” because of his failure to serve in the military.

He was also recruited to join the military by other men who would come in the day or at midnight to get him to sign some papers. The men came to his house five times. As a result, Saballo-Cortez went to sleep somewhere else. He could only identify one of the recruiters as “Carlos”. Military service is compulsory in Nicaragua.

He testified that he was recruited to join the Comite for the defense of Sandinistas (CDS) because he worked for Coca-Cola in the “department of propaganda.” Because of his refusal to serve in the CDS, he did not receive a food card which would have entitled him to pay less for his food. He was also denied a “permit of my license for my work.” The refusal denied him the right to work in his country.

He was also “denounced” for “contraband of arms” in the middle of 1981 and detained for three hours.

On cross-examination, Saballo-Cortez testified that he was issued a passport by the present Sandinista government on September 30, 1982. He experienced no problem in obtaining a passport. It took only one week to process his passport application. He also received an exit visa on September 30, 1982, through a travel agent without experiencing any trouble. He received a second exit visa on November 17, 1982.

3. Inconsistencies In The Record

A comparison of the sworn facts in the application for asylum with Saballo-Cor-tez’s testimony, reveals the following inconsistencies:

The immigration judge pointed to other portions of the testimony which cast doubt on Saballo-Cortez’s veracity. He noted, for example, while Saballo-Cortez claimed that he faced persecution for his failure to serve in the military of his country, he was not arrested for this conduct, and was allowed to travel outside his country on a Nicaraguan passport.

The immigration judge was not persuaded that Saballo-Cortez had been threatened to join the military, and noted that this testimony was not corroborated. See Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523, 1527 (D.C.Cir.1983) [petitioner failed to provide any other evidence to support his own conclusory statements that he would be persecuted upon his return to El Salvador].

The immigration judge also found that there was no evidence that Saballo-Cortez belonged to any political organization or *1359 had taken any political position. 3 Thus, he failed to meet his burden of satisfying the immigration judge that it was more probable than not that he had suffered past persecution or feared persecution because of his political opinions.

The immigration judge found that while there was evidence that Saballo-Cortez had been suspected of gun-running, the incident occurred in 1981 and no guns were found. We note also that no further action appears to have been taken by Nicaraguan authorities with respect to this alleged offense, and that Saballo-Cortez was allowed to leave the country on a government passport. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir.1978) [petitioner was issued passport by Haitian government; court found it difficult to believe that Haiti would allow him to leave if it feared his loyalty, as asserted by petitioner]. We agree with the .immigration judge that this incident does not support a finding of present danger to Saballo-Cortez.

We are satisfied from our independent review of the entire record that there are substantial inconsistencies in the application and testimony of Saballo-Cortez to sustain the finding of the immigration judge and the BIA that he was not a truthful witness.

In spite of Saballo-Cortez’s stubborn defiance and repeated resistance to participation in his country’s compulsory service requirements, he was permitted to work until the day he left without arrest or harm. He was also granted a passport and exit visa. These facts cast great doubt on Saballo-Cortez’s claim that he fears persecution. The fact that he was denied such perquisites as discounts on food and a special work permit for some other type of employment does not establish persecution. See Raass v. INS, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.1982) [asylum relief in U.S. depends on something more than generalized economic disadvantage at the destination]. As noted by the BIA, these sanctions, i.e. denial of special privileges to purchase food or obtain more desirable employment may well be legitimate under Nicaraguan law. Saballo-Cortez’s claim of grotesque threats against his life do not appear credible in light of the evidence that he remained free from arrest, fully employed, and received full governmental cooperation when he applied for permission to travel. The immigration judge and the BIA were free to infer that if he was subject to official persecution or death because of his draft resistance, he would not have been given a passport.

E. Applicability Of the McMullen Rule

Saballo-Cortez argues that in McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1981), this court “strongly suggested that the absence of evidence contradicting an alien’s assertions regarding asylum should lead to a granting of asylum.” In support of this novel proposition, Saballo-Cortez relies on the following passage from McMullen : “The INS did not submit evidence of its own which indicated that any of McMullen’s exhibits were inaccurate, nor did it submit independent evidence showing McMullen’s lack of credibility.” Id. at 1317 . The quoted observation by this court directly follows a recitation of the BIA’s finding that McMullen’s testimony was not credible and that his reports of terrorism were not relevant because they were not directed at the petitioner.

We do not read McMullen as compelling the granting of asylum whenever the petitioner’s testimony is not contradicted by evidence presented by the INS. We noted in McMullen that “the burden of proof was on McMullen to prove a likelihood of persecution.” Id. at 1317 . Before this court, McMullen conceded “that the *1360 burden is on the alien to prove likelihood of persecution and. [submitted] that he met this burden.” Id. at 1317 . After reviewing the entire record in that case, we agreed with McMullen. A comparison of the facts of this case with the record in McMullen demonstrates that our decision in that case has no application to the matter sub judiced. 4

In McMullen , the petitioner presented overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence which was fully corroborated that he faced likelihood of persecution in Ireland from the British because he deserted the army to join the Provisional Irish Republican Army, (PIRA) and from the PIRA because his resignation from that group due to its extremist activities. Thereafter, he was im-. prisoned by the Republic of Ireland for three years for his PIRA activities. Upon his release, he was asked to help the PIRA and refused. After repeated PIRA intimidation, including being kidnapped, he agreed to help. When he refused to kidnap and execute an American, he was brought before a PIRA court of inquiry because of his conduct. When told by a friend that he would be murdered for his disobedience, McMullen fled to the United States, “using an assumed name to obtain a visa.” (emphasis added) id. at 1314 . When he arrived in the United States he contacted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, hoping to obtain asylum for sharing his knowledge of PIRA activities. Id.

The immigration judge believed McMul-len’s testimony, after observing his demeanor as a witness, id. at 1318 , and concluded that deportation should be withheld. Id. at 1313 . The BIA reversed, finding that McMullen had not shown a sufficient likelihood that he would suffer persecution upon deportation to Ireland, id. at 1313-14 , because his testimony was “inherently unbelievable.” Id. at 1317-18 .

In reversing the BIA, we noted that the INS did not argue that McMullen’s testimony was inherently unbelievable “because it is internally inconsistent or lacking in the ring of truth.” Id. at 1318 . Instead, the INS contended that “a petitioner in a deportation is motivated to lie in support of his own case.” Id. at 1318 .

We held in McMullen that:

Id. at 1318 . (Emphasis added).

In the matter before us, the immigration judge found that Saballo-Cortez was not a *1361 credible witness because his testimony and the statements in his application for asylum were internally inconsistent and lacked the ring of truth. After reviewing the record, the BIA also discredited SaballoCortez’s testimony for the same reasons. As we noted in McMullen , in applying the substantial evidence test, we do not review the facts de novo. “The principle of deference to agency expertise is still applicable, and our inquiry is limited to a review of the record to determine whether the agency’s determination is substantially supported.” Id. at 1317 .

In reviewing the record, we must defer to the immigration judge’s express or implied determination concerning credibility where the record supports this finding. See Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.1977). The findings of the immigration judge and the BIA that Saballo-Cortez’s uncorroborated beliefs were unbelievable is fully supported by the record. Thus, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision under 1253(h) and there was no abuse of discretion under 1158(a).

F. Alleged Violation of Saballo-Cortez’s Constitutional Rights

At the hearing, the immigration judge introduced a copy of a letter from the American Embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, written in response to the court’s ex parte inquiry concerning Saballo-Cortez’s arrest.

Saballo-Cortez argues for the first time before this court that this conduct was violative of his constitutional rights. Counsel for Saballo-Cortez made no objection before the immigration judge concerning the immigration judge’s questionable conduct. Commendably, Government counsel did object to the fact that the court conducted an ex parte investigation without notifying both counsel. Counsel for Saballo-Cortez made no comment concerning this matter. Based on the record before us, the conduct of the immigration judge, while inappropriate for the reasons expressed by the Government, was not prejudicial to Sa-ballo-Cortez. The immigration judge apparently unsuccessfully attempted to develop facts which would shed light on the present status of the arrest warrant for gun smuggling.

G. Conclusion

We affirm the BIA’s denial of Saballo-Cortez’s claims for the reason that he failed to meet his burden of persuasion concerning his claims of persecution and his present fears.

At oral argument, counsel for Saballo-Cortez indicated that the conduct of the immigration judge in soliciting unclassified information from the American Embassy concerning Saballo-Cortez may have created a danger for him should he now return to Nicaragua.

We cannot consider the legal effect of facts not raised below. Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2280 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982). Our affirmance on this matter is without prejudice to a motion to reopen based on the facts presented to us at oral argument.

AFFIRMED.

. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (b), the immigration judge considered Saballo-Cortez’s asylum request as a request for withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (h).

. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a), an "alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the attorney general if the attorney general determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of Section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.” (Emphasis added). We thus must review the record in this case to discern whether the denial of the petitioner's asylum request was an abuse of that discretion. See Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 550 F.Supp. 90, 93-94 (E.D.N.Y.1982), reversed on other grounds, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.1983). See also In re Lam, Interim Dec. No. 2857, p. 5 (BIA, Mar. 24, 1981) [it does not necessarily follow that an alien who has proven persecution sufficient to qualify for withholding of deportation will also be granted asylum].

. Saballo-Cortez claims on appeal to “belong to the social class of young men who refuse to give service, military or otherwise to the Nicaraguan Comite de Sandinistas or Nicaraguan Military.” In Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.1984), this court, in rejecting petitioner’s claim for asylum and withholding of deportation, held in part that the petitioner’s status as a "young urban male neither in the military nor with the guerrillas” lacked sufficient specificity to trigger political asylum. 723 F.2d at 1433 .

. The dissent argues that the substantial evidence standard of review requires reversal in this case because the INS failed to prove the alien’s testimony was internally inconsistent or lacking in the ring of truth, even though the alien's evidence consisted solely of his uncorroborated testimony. Otherwise, the dissent argues, the asylum and withholding of deportation provisions are "hollow gestures."

This misconceives the deference due under the substantial evidence test, see McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1317 , and would effectively shift the burden of proof from the alien to the INS. Even under the de novo standard of review, which accords no deference to previous administrative determinations, an appellate court could uphold an adverse determination if, after an independent examination of the record, it agreed that the alien failed to meet his burden because his testimony was not credible, regardless of what the INS proved. The dissent’s formulation of the substantial evidence standard, rather than conceiving it to be more deferential than de novo review, would create a presumption of reversal unless the INS comes forth with substantial evidence to disprove an alien’s uncorroborated testimony. The proper formulation allows us to reverse only if the trier of fact's conclusion that the alien failed to prove a clear probability of persecution lacks substantial reasonableness. We have reversed on this basis where an alien's testimony was objectively corroborated and the immigration judge initially ruled in the alien’s favor. See id. But here the testimony was uncorroborated and both the immigration judge and the BIA ruled against the alien. Based on our review of the evidence, we cannot agree that their determinations lacked substantial reasonableness.

We are not unmindful of an alien's limits in obtaining evidence to corroborate his bare testimony concerning the persecution risks in his home country. But Congress allocated the burden of proving a clear probability of persecution to the alien, and we cannot reallocate that burden under the guise of review.