22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T497,MEMORANDUM Gregory C. Bontemps, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after denying his application to proceed in forma pauperis status (“IFP”) on the ground that Bontemps has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 1291, We review de novo, Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep't 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm. The district court properly denied Bon-temps’ request to proceed IFP because at least three of Bontemps’ prior cases qualified as “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , and Bontemps did not allege facts demonstrating that he faced imminent danger at the time he filed his complaint. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (defining when a case is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , and can be considered a strike); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing imminent dan®er excePtion)' AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,24:T4c4,

MEMORANDUM

Gregory C. Bontemps, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after denying his application to proceed in forma pauperis status (“IFP”) on the ground that Bontemps has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 1291, We review de novo, Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep't 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Bon-temps’ request to proceed IFP because at least three of Bontemps’ prior cases qualified as “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , and Bontemps did not allege facts demonstrating that he faced imminent danger at the time he filed his complaint. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (defining when a case is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , and can be considered a strike); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing imminent dan®er excePtion)'

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,