I.

BACKGROUND

Appellant received a grant of felony probation after he was

returned from the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) from a diagnostic evaluation and

recommendation pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03. He then

sought to address his pending traffic infraction cases. In the

traffic court, he claimed the prosecution of his pending traffic

cases was barred by Vehicle Code section 41500 because he had been

committed to the CDCR for a diagnostic evaluation.2 The traffic

court denied his motion to dismiss his consolidated cases, and

appellant thereafter entered a guilty plea. He timely filed a

notice of appeal.

Appellant again maintains his traffic cases should have been

dismissed under section 41500 because he received a “commitment”

to the CDCR when he was placed in a diagnostic facility.

Respondent challenges this claim arguing appellant was “placed

temporarily” in a CDCR diagnostic facility, not actually committed

to the CDCR as defined in section 41500. In their initial

briefing, both parties assumed without discussion that this matter

was appealable. We requested further briefing on the

appealability issue, given appellant’s guilty plea.

2 All further undesignated references to sections are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated. -2- Appellant maintains his case is indeed appealable,

notwithstanding his guilty plea, because his claim challenges the

jurisdiction of the court and the legality of the proceedings.

Respondent now maintains this case is not appealable and,

moreover, appellant should be estopped from challenging his

sentence. We believe the claim raised here challenges the

legality of the traffic court to proceed in light of the

prosecutorial bar in section 41500. As such, we conclude this

matter is appealable. We reject respondent’s estoppel claim.

Ultimately, we reject appellant’s contention and affirm the

judgment.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability While a certificate of appealability (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) is

not required for misdemeanor or infraction appeals taken after a

guilty or no contest plea (In re Olsen (1986) 176 Cal.App.3rd 386,

390; People v. Castro (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9, 14; see Pen.

Code, § 1466, subd. (b)), post-guilty-plea misdemeanor or

infraction appeals are limited to those that raise “reasonably

constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the

legality of the proceedings.” (People v. Egbert (1997) 59

Cal.App.4th 503, 508 (Egbert); see In re Olsen, supra, 176

Cal.App.3rd at p. 390.) This is because “it was a settled tenet of

the common law that ‘. . . irregularities not going to the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings will not be reviewed’

after judgment on a guilty plea.” (In re John B. (1989) 215

-3- Cal.App.3rd 477, 483, quoting Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal.2d

864, 870.) The reason for the rule is clear – a guilty plea

“`concedes that the prosecution possesses legally admissible

evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt’” (Egbert, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 508, citing People v.

Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3rd 116, 125), it “waives any right to

raise questions regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency

or admissibility, even if the claim of evidentiary error is based

on constitutional violations.” (Ibid.)

Moreover, because a guilty plea also waives any irregularity

in the proceedings that would not preclude subsequent proceedings

to establish guilt, they may not be asserted on appeal after a

guilty plea. (People v. Turner, supra, 171 Cal.App.3rd at p. 126.)

“In other words, by pleading guilty the defendant admits that he

did that which he is accused of doing and he thereby obviates the

procedural necessity of establishing that he committed the crime

charged . . . A defendant thereafter can raise only those

questions which go to the power of the state to try him despite

his guilt.”

(Ibid.) Here, appellant claims his prosecution should be barred

after he was sent to the CDCR for a diagnostic evaluation. In

other words, he is challenging the legality of the proceedings

after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss under section

41500. Appellant is not challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to convict him, any procedural defects or irregularities, or the sentenced imposed. Because appellant is raising “only

those questions which go to the power of the state to try him

-4- despite his guilt” (ibid.), we believe, notwithstanding his guilty

plea, this case is appealable.3

Respondent nevertheless argues appellant should be estopped

from complaining about a sentence to which he agreed. However,

appellant is not contesting his sentence. Rather, he is

challenging the ability of the state to prosecute him in the first

instance. Respondent cites People v. Ramirez (2008) 159

Cal.App.4th 1412, to support its estoppel claim, arguing appellant

received the benefit of his plea bargain, and he should not be

heard to complain here. At no time in the traffic court did

appellant concede the state’s ability to prosecute him. To the

contrary, appellant pressed his motion to dismiss, and only after

the traffic court denied it, did he enter a guilty plea. We do not

believe appellant is “trifling” with this court to “better the

bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000)

22 Cal.4th 290, 295; see People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110,

116-117.) Instead, appellant is again challenging the legality of

the proceedings in light of the traffic court’s failure to dismiss

under section 41500. We reject respondent’s estoppel argument.

B. Review Standard

We must decide, as a question of first impression, whether a

probationer “placed temporarily” in a CDCR diagnostic facility

pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03, has received a “commitment

to the custody” of the CDCR within the meaning of section 41500. In doing so we are tasked with interpreting the language in each

3 Because we find this case appealable as raising a question going to the legality of the proceedings, we decline to consider whether the trial court also lacked fundamental jurisdiction. -5- statute. This inquiry involves our independent review, which

requires us to first look to the language of the statutes, mindful

that our “fundamental task” is “to ascertain the intent of the

lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute[s].”

(People v. Pennington (2017) 3 Cal.5th 786, 795.) If the words

“appear susceptible to more than one reasonable construction,” we

look to “other indicia of legislative intent,” and the entire

statutory scheme instead of “a single word or phrase.” (Ibid.)

Moreover, if the statutory language is ambiguous, we apply other

“maxims of statutory construction,” to include: avoiding absurd

results, considering the consequences of a particular meaning –

including impact on public policy, and following express

legislative intent, if any. (People v. Spriggs (2014) 224

Cal.App.4th 150, 154-155.)

C. Appellant Did Not Receive A Prison Commitment When He Was

Placed Temporarily In A CDCR Diagnostic Facility

Section 41500, subdivision (a), bars the prosecution of a

person for “pending” non-felony offenses arising out of the

operation of a motor vehicle “at the time of his or her commitment

to the custody” of the CDCR, the Division of Juvenile Justice

(DJJ), or to the county jail pursuant to the Criminal Justice

Realignment Act (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)). This statute “is

an exception to the rule that all criminal offenses are subject to

prosecution.” (Joseph v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 498,

503.) The statute was originally drafted to grant a fresh start to parolees released from prison or the Youth Authority and to

provide freedom from detainers which may impede an inmate’s

release. (People v. Lopez (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6, 11;

-6- People v. Freeman (1987) 225 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 1, 4 & fn. 2.) The

Legislature believed the rehabilitation process was aided by

eliminating interruptions due to arrest and prosecution for

certain non-felony traffic offenses. (People v. Lopez, supra, 218

Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 11.)

Appellant maintains the statute is clear, “without any

condition or qualification” of how a person received a

“commitment” to the CDCR. He adds, the Legislature expressly

excluded alcohol-related offenses from section 41500, but did not

otherwise limit the statute’s application. He concludes if the

Legislature meant to exclude people placed temporarily in the CDCR

for a diagnostic evaluation, it would have expressly said so as it

did with alcohol-related offenses. Respondent counters that

temporary placement in a diagnostic facility before sentencing is

not a commitment to the CDCR. Respondent points to the

legislative intent in section 41500, arguing that temporary

placement in a diagnostic facility is not akin to a lengthier

prison term requiring a fresh start for the released parolee.

While section 41500 may be facially interpreted as appellant

asserts, we agree with respondent that a temporary placement in a

diagnostic facility is not a commitment to the CDCR. The statute’s

legislative history supports our conclusion that a “commitment”

means a person committed by a sentence imposed to either the CDCR

or local custody under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act. In

1972, the Legislature noted that the purpose of section 41500 is to allow prisoners to leave state prison with a clean record.

(Sen. Amend to Assem. Bill No. 749 (1972 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 25,

1972.) Other courts have recognized this legislative purpose. (See

-7- People v. Lopez, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 11; People v.

Freeman, supra, 225 Cal.App.3rd at p. Supp. 4.) In 2015, the

Legislature extended application of the statute to people

committed “to a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section

1170 of the Penal Code.” (Assem. Bill No. 1156 (2015-2016 Reg.

Sess.) § 1.) A “commitment” to local custody pursuant to Penal

Code section 1170, subdivision (h), is necessarily a sentence

imposed.

In contrast, a person placed temporarily in a CDCR diagnostic

facility pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03 is not yet

sentenced. (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd.(b)[“In determining the

appropriate term, the court may consider the record in the case,

the probation officer’s report, other reports, including reports

received pursuant to [Penal Code s]ection 1203.03 . . .and any

further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.”].) The

temporary placement occurs to assist the court to determine the

proper sentence, after a consideration of all sentencing factors.

(People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 749, 756; People v. Tang

(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 669, 678-679.) Because a person placed

temporarily in a diagnostic facility has not received a commitment

for a sentence imposed, we believe that person is not protected by

the prosecutorial bar in section 41500.

Moreover, a literal construction, as appellant asserts, would

not further the legislative goal behind the statute – to give

people a fresh start for rehabilitation upon release from a lengthy term of incarceration. (People v. Lopez, supra, 218

Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 6; People v. Freeman, supra, 225

Cal.App.3rd at p. Supp. 4.) In contrast, a person sent to a

-8- diagnostic facility can spend no more than 90 days in the facility

before being returned to the sentencing court. The statute enables

the trial court to order a prison-eligible defendant be “placed

temporarily” in a “diagnostic facility” for treatment and

diagnosis, if the court “concludes that a just disposition of the

case requires” such services. (Pen. Code, § 1203.03, subd. (a).)

Within 90 days, the prison director shall “cause defendant to be

observed and examined and shall forward to the court his diagnosis

and recommendation concerning the disposition of defendant’s

case.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.03, subd. (b).)

We do not believe the rehabilitative fresh start envisioned by

the Legislature for inmates released after being sentenced to a

lengthy term of incarceration was also meant for a probationer who

was placed temporarily in a diagnostic facility. We think this

the more reasonable result given the potential mischief in

interpreting the statute otherwise. For example, appellant’s

interpretation would extend application of section 41500 to

probationers, a class of people clearly not considered by the

Legislature.

Appellant nevertheless maintains that probationers returned

from a CDCR diagnostic evaluation have not been expressly excluded

from section 41500, as other alcohol-related offenders have been.

We again note that the Legislature recently extended application

of the statute to inmates sentenced to local custody under the

Criminal Justice Realignment Act (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)). The Legislature, however, did not extend the statute’s application

to probationers, like appellant, who were returned from a 90-day

-9- diagnostic evaluation. Had the Legislature intended to include

probationers in section 41500, it could have clearly said so.

At oral argument appellant recognized the legislative purpose

behind section 41500 was to give inmates a rehabilitative fresh

start on release from custody. He contended he was no less

deserving of a fresh start than a CDCR or DJJ parolee. While a

fresh start is a laudable goal, it is the Legislature and not this

court who can extend section 41500 to probationers. We note under

appellant’s construction, probationers sentenced to longer jail

terms, for example 365 days, without being temporarily placed in a

CDCR diagnostic facility, would be unable to avail themselves of

section 41500. In contrast, probationers receiving much shorter

jail terms on return from a 90-day diagnostic evaluation, would

enjoy the statute’s prosecutorial bar. Certainly, a probationer

serving a longer jail term is as deserving of a fresh start, if

not more so, than a shorter-term probationer returned from a

diagnostic evaluation. We are unwilling to create this anomaly by

interpreting section 41500 as appellant contends.4

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

4 For the first time, at oral argument appellant sought to make an equal protection argument. We are perplexed because appellant expressly disclaimed making an equal protection argument in his opening brief. In any event, we decline to consider this argument and consider it forfeited for the failure to raise it in the briefing. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 487-488, fn. 3; People v. Harris (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 1246, 1256, fn. 8.) -10- __________________________________ Hon. Brian Alvarez, Acting Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division Fresno County Superior Court

WE CONCUR:

__________________________________ Hon. Rosemary T. McGuire, Judge

_________________________________ Hon. Gary D. Hoff, Judge

-11-