facts”). The district court’s requirement to the contrary would vitiate the False

Claims Act, by excluding many whistle-blowers who—as here—allege insider

knowledge of wrongdoing that few others would be positioned to reveal and solely

lack access to the corporate documents outlining the precise nature of the

company’s obligations. See United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health

Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 778 (7th Cir. 2016).

Nor does Rule 8(a) require greater specificity. The district court’s hypothesis

that the contract may contain some sort of error rate proffers a defense for QTC,

which it is free to assert—but that speculation does not prevent Vatan from

asserting a claim, based on information and belief, sufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss. Vatan’s allegation that QTC submitted claims to the VA with

knowledge or in reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance “of [QTC’s] actual

performance of the contractual requirements,” supported by his pleading as to the

nature of that contract, is sufficiently “plausible” to withstand a motion to dismiss

under a theory of implied false certification. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). Contrary to the district court’s assertion, the specific contractual

language and any contemplated error rate in the contract are immaterial to whether

this claim is adequately pled. Vatan alleges that QTC essentially lied to the

government as to whether the files were reviewed. That is a material

3 misrepresentation, for purposes of factually false certification, irrespective of any

error rate built into the contract.

2. Vatan’s complaint otherwise meets Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading

standard. Vatan has “allege[d] the who, what, when, where, and how of the

misconduct charged, including what is false or misleading . . . and why it is false.”

United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir. 2016)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The allegations are “specific

enough to give defendants notice of the particular [alleged] misconduct . . . so that

they can defend against the charge.” Id. (quoting Bly-Magee v. Cal., 236 F.3d

1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)).

QTC’s argument that Vatan has failed to adequately plead “who” was

responsible for the misconduct is incorrect. Vatan has proffered the names of

individuals allegedly involved in perpetuating the purported fraud. He has also

alleged “with specificity how the company itself institutionalized and enforced its

fraudulent scheme.” United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 125

(D.C. Cir. 2015). We have previously found that such allegations sufficiently

identify “who” was involved, such that the defendant has the requisite notice to

“defend against the charge.” United Healthcare, 848 F.3d at 1180-81 (finding

similar allegations sufficient under Rule 9(b)). The same is true here.

4 3. Vatan’s claims satisfy Rule 8(a). Vatan has alleged the requisite

elements of False Claims Act claims under theories of both factually false and

implied false certification. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.

Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016); United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead

Sciences, Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2017). Regarding factually false

certification, he alleges that QTC instructed analysts to always answer yes to

question six on the VA checklist, “was the entire claims folder reviewed,”

irrespective of whether that answer was true. He provides specific examples of VA

review in which the answer was, allegedly, not true. He therefore successfully

alleges that QTC “misrepresent[ed] what goods or services . . . it provided to the

government.” Campie, 862 F.3d at 900.

As to implied false certification, Vatan alleges, in essence, that QTC charged

the government for worthless services and concealed the worthlessness of those

services. That concealment allegedly took the form of misrepresentations on the

checklists that the files had been reviewed, while “omitting critical information”

regarding the extraordinarily cursory—in some cases, as alleged by Vatan, nearly

non-existent—nature of that review. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 903. The claims that

Vatan alleges that QTC made here, like the claims in Universal Health Services,

“fall squarely within the rule that half-truths—representations that state the truth

5 only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information—can be

actionable misrepresentations.” 136 S. Ct. at 2000.

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

disposition.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

6