22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4fa,MEMORANDUM Michael E. Boyd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo questions of constitutional standing. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. Dismissal of Boyd’s action was proper because Boyd failed to allege facts showing that defendants caused Boyd any cognizable injury as required for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (elements of Article III standing); see also Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1139 (“We also have an independent duty to assure that standing exists, irrespective of whether the parties challenge it.”). We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n,2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T52c,

MEMORANDUM

Michael E. Boyd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo questions of constitutional standing. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Boyd’s action was proper because Boyd failed to allege facts showing that defendants caused Boyd any cognizable injury as required for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (elements of Article III standing); see also Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1139 (“We also have an independent duty to assure that standing exists, irrespective of whether the parties challenge it.”).

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n,2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.