Appellants Miller and Freeman were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of California Penal Code §§ 182 and 187. They appeal the district court’s dismissal of their petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 .

FACTS

The district court reviewed the state record from which the following facts appeared: Appellant Miller, a physician, was principal owner of a corporation which ran two medical clinics. Appellant Freeman was employed by Miller as a janitor at both clinics. In October, 1978, one of the clinics was destroyed by fire. Fire investigators determined that the fire was arson-related. White, a long time friend of Freeman, contacted Woods of the Indio police department and claimed to have information regarding the fire. At the request of police and an insurance company White met with Freeman on several occasions to elicit details concerning the fire.

When White met with Freeman on December 20, Freeman asked White if he would be willing to kill someone and White responded in the affirmative. Freeman asked White what it would be worth to him; White said $5000. After Freeman made a phone call, the two men proceeded to Miller’s office at the unburned clinic where they met Miller.

Miller asked White if he would be willing to kill Miller’s wife, from whom he was separated, for $5000. Miller and White agreed during this conversation on the time, place and manner of the planned killing. Miller then told White to meet him at a bank in Beverly Hills on December 22 to receive half the money, the other half to be paid after the killing.

White failed to meet Miller as arranged, but instead met Freeman and told him he did not have the silencer for his gun that Miller had requested. The two men drove to Miller’s office. Miller stated that he had waited for White for two and a half hours and wanted to know why White had not met him.

Miller stated that he wanted his wife killed no later than Sunday, December 24. White stated that he could not do it that quickly because he needed a silencer. Miller gave White $3000 in one hundred dollar bills. After he spoke briefly on the telephone, Miller stated the murder could not occur that weekend and took back the $3000.

On December 27, White and Freeman met at the Indio Hotel and drove to the clinic where they met Miller. There was further discussion between Miller and White about murdering Miller’s wife. *992 They discussed the silencer and a date for the killing. White said he would try to obtain a silencer and Miller told him to contact Freeman when he obtained one.

Freeman and White returned to the Hotel Indio bar where they met Russell, an undercover investigator for the Riverside District Attorney's office. White stated he did not want to do the killing and suggested that Russell do it. Freeman asked Russell if he wanted to kill Mrs. Miller and Russell replied he was interested in making $5000. Russell stated he would need a photograph of Mrs. Miller and information about her vehicle and her residence. Freeman supplied the necessary information and $4000 in cash on January 2. He told him he would have the other $1000 the next day. Russell said he wanted more money and Freeman agreed to check it out.

Russell and Freeman met the following day and Freeman gave Russell an additional $1000 and drew for him a diagram of Mrs. Miller’s house. He told Russell that Miller stated he might be able to come up with an additional $2000 in six months. When Russell suggested he talk to Miller, Freeman refused.

On January 4, Russell saw Miller at Alphy’s Restaurant. He identified himself, told Miller that they had a mutual friend named Freeman, and said that he was the one who was going to handle it. Miller asked how he got involved; Russell responded that he decided to do it when White said he could not. Russell asked Miller for more money. Miller stated he might be able to pay more money in about six months. When Miller indicated he did not want to talk anymore, he was arrested by surveilling officers.

ANALYSIS

“State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon proving that their detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against state action by the Federal Constitution.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 , 83 S.Ct. 745, 756 , 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 137 , 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984).

Appellants challenge their convictions as unconstitutional on numerous grounds. We consider each contention and its pertinent facts separately.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions because the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged. Specifically, they contend that because neither they, White, nor Russell intended to kill Mrs. Miller, the necessary element of intent to kill was lacking, and they could not properly be convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Instead, appellants argue, they should have been charged with conspiracy to solicit another to commit murder. The solicitation charge would carry a maximum sentence of 6 years; 1 the conspiracy charge carries a sentence of 25 years to life. 2

When a petitioner in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas case challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the issue is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

The evidence in this ease was adequate to support the conviction under this standard. The evidence of detailed conversations between appellants, White and Russell concerning the plans for murdering Mrs. Miller clearly established appellants’ intent to kill. The mere fact that neither appellant intended to do the act of killing himself is insufficient to defeat their convictions. The goal of the conspiracy was not, as appellants contend, the solicitation of murder, but the commission of the mur *993 der of Mrs. Miller. The evidence established the agreement between appellants to accomplish that goal and the overt acts committed in furtherance of it. See People v. Horn, 12 Cal.3d 290 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 524 P.2d 1300 (1974) (proof of conspiracy to commit a specific offense requires proof that conspirators intended to bring about the elements of the conspired offense); see also People v. Adami, 36 Cal.App.3d 452 , 111 Cal.Rptr. 544 (1974) (specific intent to commit murder shown by solicitation).

2. Adequacy of Jury Instructions

a. Lesser included offense instruction

Appellants next argue that they were unconstitutionally convicted because the trial court did not sua sponte instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy to splicit another to commit murder under the lesser included offense doctrine. Due process does not require that a lesser included offense instruction be given unless the evidence warrants such an instruction. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 , 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052 , 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). California law is essentially the same: it requires a trial judge to instruct a jury on all lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offenses were presented, but not when there is no evidence the offense was less than that charged. People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.3d 703, 715 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 9 , 518 P.2d 913 (1974), disapproved on other grounds, People v. Flannel, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 n. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 93 n. 12, 603 P.2d 1 (1980); People v. Saldana, 157 Cal.App.3d 443, 450 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 465, 471 (1984).

Appellants’ argument fails for the same reason that their preceding argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence fails. The evidence in this case showed that the goal of the conspiracy was the commission of the murder of Mrs. Miller, not the solicitation of the murder. Thus the evidence supported the instruction given, not the instruction appellants argue should have been given under the lesser included offense doctrine.

b. Entrapment instruction

Appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of their requested jury instruction on entrapment. Whether they were entitled to an entrapment instruction depends upon state law. See Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir.1977). Failure to give an instruction which might be proper as a matter of state law does not amount to a federal constitutional violation. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 , 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1567 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.1983).

Appellants also claim that the denial of the instruction deprived them of due process of the law. Due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence supports it. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 , 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052 , 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). The test of entrapment under California law is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal.3d 675, 689-90 , 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 467 , 591 P.2d 947 (1979). In this case there is no evidence of inducement by law enforcement agents upon which an instruction could be based. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the criminal activity was conceived and executed by appellants, and that they solicited an informant and an undercover police officer to aid them in their plan. Thus appellants’ due process argument also fails.

3. Specific and General Statutes

Appellants claim that a specific California statute, California Penal Code § 653f(b) (solicitation), governs their alleged criminal activity, and preempts application of the general statutes, California Penal Code §§ 182 (conspiracy) and 187 (murder). Although cast as a federal constitutional issue, appellants’ claim rests on an asserted violation of state law. It therefore fails to allege the deprivation of a federal right necessary to entitle them to *994 habeas corpus relief. See Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.1983).

4. Constitutionality of the Information

Appellant Miller contends that the information on which he was charged was fatally defective because it did not set forth the requisite intent. The information accused appellants of violating California Penal Code §§ 182 and 187 in that “they did wilfully and unlawfully conspire * * * to commit the crime of murder during the period from December 20, 1978 through January 4, 1979.”

Under the Sixth Amendment, an accused has the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” The Constitution is satisfied if the information states “the elements of an offense charged with sufficient clarity to apprise a defendant of what to defend against.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 , 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-47 , 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962).

The information was not constitutionally defective. An information which tracks the applicable state statute affords defendants fair notice of the crime with which they are charged and is not required to specify the requisite mental state. United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.1983).

5. Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Woods, the Indio Police Officer who had supervised White and Russell, knew that Miller had been arrested on January 4, 1979, had a preliminary hearing, and was represented by counsel. A Charles Watson told Officer Woods that he had received information that Miller still intended to kill his wife. Beginning in March, 1979, Woods used Watson as an informant to determine whether Miller was still plotting to kill his wife. Watson was told not to interfere with Miller’s attorney-client relationship.

Watson contacted Miller on several occasions. He told Miller that prison was a bad place, asked Miller what he knew about prosecution witnesses, offered to have Miller’s case dismissed, said he could eliminate prosecution witnesses for Miller, and told Miller not to confer with his attorney. Miller’s attorney did not know about these meetings. Watson’s contacts with Miller were terminated when the police learned of his offer to kill prosecution witnesses.

Miller moved for dismissal of the case on the grounds of police misconduct. The prosecution argued that exclusion of any evidence obtained by reason of Watson’s misconduct was the proper remedy. The trial judge denied Miller’s motion and ordered the exclusion of any evidence obtained by Watson even though he did not think Watson had obtained any information of value to the prosecution.

At trial appellants themselves requested the court to admit the evidence of Miller’s involvement with Watson to assist in establishing an entrapment defense. The trial court excluded the evidence under California Evidence Code § 352 which grants a court discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time, create substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Appellant Miller now argues that exclusion of the evidence violated his rights to due process and trial by jury.

In a habeas proceeding, determining whether the exclusion of evidence in the trial court violated petitioner’s due process rights involves a balancing test. In weighing the importance of evidence offered by a defendant against the state’s interest in exclusion, the court should consider the probative value of the evidence on the central issue; its reliability; whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 137 , 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). A court must also consider the purpose of the rule; its importance; how well the rule implements its purpose; and *995 how well the purpose applies to the case at hand. The court must give due weight to the substantial state interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial efficiency, and in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence. Id.

The trial court properly applied these elements of the balancing test and held that the evidence was to be excluded. The proffered evidence was not probative of the central issue of appellants’ guilt or innocence. Its connection with appellants’ asserted entrapment defense was too tenuous for the evidence to be admitted because the activities complained of were completely separate from and all took place after Miller’s arrest. Therefore, the evidence’s slight probative value did not outweigh the state’s interest in excluding evidence that would prolong the trial and confuse the issues. The court’s ruling did not violate appellants’ due process rights.

6. Discharge of Jurors

Two jurors were dismissed on the fifth day of jury deliberation. Juror Koch called in sick with the flu that morning; all counsel agreed that she be discharged and replaced with an alternate. Juror Lance informed the bailiff that Juror Johnston had been intoxicated the previous morning. The trial judge noted for the record that he had observed Mr. Johnston dropping off to sleep during rereading of testimony that day. The Court Clerk confirmed these observations.

The court held a hearing in chambers at which appellants’ counsel were present but not appellants. The judge questioned Mr. Johnston, who denied having been intoxicated but admitted having fallen asleep in the jury box. Bailiff Brown, Juror Lance and Jury Foreman Overson, who were in a position to observe Mr. Johnston’s demean- or, were also interviewed. Each testified that they had smelled alcohol on Mr. Johnston’s breath. The judge dismissed Mr. Johnston over the objections of both defense counsel.

In open court, the trial judge replaced the two jurors with alternates, and instructed the jury to set aside and disregard earlier deliberations and to begin deliberating anew.

Appellants complain that the dismissal and replacement of two jurors deprived them of their rights to trial by jury and due process.

The discharge and replacement of the jurors did not violate appellants’ federal constitutional rights. The California substitution procedure followed by the trial court 3 preserved the “essential feature” of the jury required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 , 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1905 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970); Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 177 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986 , 100 S.Ct. 2971 , 64 L.Ed.2d 844 (1980).

7. Exclusion of Appellants from the hearing.

Appellants claim that their exclusion from the in-chambers hearing violated their rights to due process, to confront witnesses against them, and to present evidence on their behalf.

The rights to a public trial and to due process generally include the right of defendants and their counsel to be present at all stages of trial. Polizzi v. U.S., 550 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.1976); Bustamante v. Cardwell, 497 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.1974) (Bustamante II); Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269 (9th Cir.1972) (Bustamante I). Violation of a defendant’s right to be present does not require reversal if in the particular case the defendant’s absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Polizzi, 550 F.2d at 1138 . This is such a case. Appellants’ due process rights were protected by their counsels’ presence during the proceedings. Counsel fully partici *996 pated in the hearing; they were given time to confer with their clients, to inform them of the proceedings, and to ask their clients how they wished to proceed. Exclusion of the appellants from the proceeding was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellants were not denied their Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against [them]” because jurors are not witnesses against the defendant. Id.

Nor were appellants’ rights to due process abridged because they might have been able to testify to their observations of juror Johnston’s demeanor had they been present in chambers. The trial judge heard testimony from percipient witnesses concerning juror Johnston’s demeanor and behavior; the judge also had his own observations to draw upon. Opening up an inquiry into the retention or discharge of a trial juror to include the testimony of the defendants on trial obviously raises sensitive considerations, resolution of which is best left to the trial court. Appellants have not shown that the court abused its discretion under California Evidence Code § 352 in refusing their request to testify. Appellants were not deprived of due process by the exclusion of their proffered evidence under the balancing test of Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.1983).

8. Ineffective assistance of counsel.

At the end of the fourth day of jury deliberations, appellant Miller’s counsel, Mr. Scherotter, requested the court’s permission to be absent from further proceedings in the case. Mr. Scherotter informed the court that he had briefed his associate, Mr. Mandanich, on the case and that Miller had consented to Mr. Mandanich’s representation. The trial judge informed Miller of his right to have Mr. Scherotter present and questioned him to ascertain whether he consented to his absence. Miller responded that he understood his rights and that he waived his right to have Mr. Scherotter present.

Miller argues nonetheless that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel, Mr. Scherotter, “abandoned” him during jury deliberations. He also claims that Mr. Mandanich provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

To obtain relief in habeas corpus review on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show that his counsel made errors that a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have made, and he must demonstrate prejudice. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.1984). Miller has shown neither.

Both claims lack merit. The trial court questioned Miller about his counsel’s departure and the substitution of Mr. Mandanich; Miller consented to it. Moreover, Miller failed to demonstrate that Mr. Mandanich did not act as a reasonably competent attorney or that any prejudice resulted from his conduct.

CONCLUSION

Appellants are not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because they have failed to show that their convictions violate the federal Constitution. The judgment of the district court dismissing their petitions for writ of habeas corpus is

AFFIRMED.

. California Penal Code §§ 653f(b) and 187.

. California Penal Code §§ 182 and 187.

. California Penal Code §§ 1089 and 1123 permit substitution of an alternate juror when a regular juror is discharged for good cause.