We must decide whether a covered employee who quit his job is entitled to benefits under Title II of the Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978 (“Redwood Act”), Pub.L. No. 95-250, §§ 201-213, 92 Stat. 163 , 172-82. 1 Under the authority of Demarinis v. Donovan, 728 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir.1984), we must conclude that he is.

Holt was a foreman for Simpson Timber Company, an affected employer under the Redwood Act. See Redwood Act §§ 201(6)-(9). On January 16, 1979, Holt informed his supervisor that he was under “tremendous pressure” and wanted to quit. Told to reconsider, the next day Holt repeated his desire to quit, and offered to give thirty days notice. Not wanting a dissatisfied employee, the supervisor told Holt to leave immediately but agreed to pay him through the end of the month.

Holt received California unemployment compensation benefits as an employee who quit “for cause,” based on a determination by a California unemployment compensation administrative law judge that Holt quit on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Holt also applied to the California Employment Development Department (EDD) for benefits under the Redwood Employee Protection Program. Although initially deemed ineligible, Holt received an amended notice from the EDD, dated November 14, 1979, awarding him weekly layoff benefits under the Redwood Act.

Two days later, the EDD issued a legal opinion that a qualifying “layoff” within the meaning of the Act “occurs only when an affected employer has not made work available to any employee.” The EDD issued internal memoranda in early 1980 explaining that when an employee voluntarily leaves available work, no qualifying layoff has occurred. As a result of this interpretation, “applicants initially classified as ‘affected’ based on a voluntary quit with good cause” were to be “decertified].”

On April 10, 1980, the EDD issued a second amended notice advising Holt of his ineligibility for Redwood benefits. Holt appealed this determination to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. The administrative law judge found Holt ineligible because he “was not laid off, but voluntarily left his employment when continued employment was available to him.” The Secretary sustained this decision. Under our decision in Demarinis, 728 F.2d 1266 , the EDD lacked authority to reclassify him, and we reverse.

In Demarinis , as here, petitioner voluntarily left his position and began to collect Redwood Act benefits. Subsequently, the EDD changed its eligibility policy and determined that Demarinis was ineligible for *1047 benefits under the Act. Our court held the Secretary to be time barred from redetermining petitioner’s eligibility for benefits. Demarinis, 728 F.2d at 1267 ; see 29 C.F.R. § 92.50 (c) (1984); Cal.Unemp.Ins.Code § 1382 (West 1972 & Supp.1985).

That same result must obtain here. Holt began to receive benefits in November 1979, and was not advised of his ineligibility until April 1980. 29 C.F.R. § 92.50 (c) provides that the EDD may reconsider eligibility determinations under the same terms and conditions as it may reconsider its own determinations made under the unemployment insurance laws of California. Section 1332(a) of the California Unemployment Insurance Code permits reconsideration of a determination within twenty days after mailing or service of the notice of determination. Because the Secretary has not met this time limit, the petition must be allowed.

Judgment for petitioner.

. Title II of the Redwood Act is not codified.