facts of [this] case,” a three month delay between the initial download and the

search did not make the warrant stale, United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745-46

(9th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (finding no staleness where

3 there was a ten month delay combined with attestations similar to the instant case

regarding child pornography collectors).

3. Evidence. Any abuse of discretion by the district court for failing to

review the two images and six-second video of child pornography before allowing

the Government to publish them to the jury was harmless. Cf. United States v.

Merino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d 758, 761-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding “[a]llowing the

jury to view more than ten minutes of film portraying children engaged in graphic

sexual conduct” was not harmless). First, Nguyen makes no allegation or factual

demonstration that some of the images or video clips not shown were less

inflammatory than the ones shown to the jury. Second, “the district court used just

about every tool at its disposal to minimize the inflammatory nature of the

images,” United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008), by severely

minimizing (from over five hundred videos and images to two images and one, six-

second video clip) what the Government was allowed to show and giving a

cautionary instruction when the evidence was presented. Finally, the evidence

against Nguyen was overwhelming: (1) Nguyen was sleeping in his bedroom when

the search was conducted, (2) the search revealed child pornography on various

hard drives and the computer next to Nguyen, (3) Nguyen’s personal files were on

4 the hard drives, and (4) one of the residents of the home testified that Nguyen told

him he was in trouble for “download[ing] some movies.”

4. Alibi Instruction. The district court did not err by refusing to give an alibi

jury instruction. To prove the charged offense, the Government only needed to

prove Nguyen possessed child pornography “on or about January 29, 2013.” The

fact that Nguyen might have an alibi for other dates is not relevant to the charge

and, thus, there was no legal basis for the instruction. See United States v. Kayser,

488 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007).

5. Dual Purpose Instruction. The district court did not plainly err by failing

to give a dual purpose instruction. Although the district court did not give a formal

instruction at the close of evidence, it sua sponte gave a dual purpose instruction

after each of the relevant Government witnesses testified. The instruction given

during the trial materially communicated the necessary distinctions between expert

and percipient testimony, particularly ensuring that no “unmerited credibility” was

ascribed to the fact testimony. United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir.

2014).

AFFIRMED.

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