facts underlying the alleged fraud until three years before she brought her action.

See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 920–21 (Cal. 2005). The

operative complaint contains no such allegations.

2. The district court properly dismissed Marquez’s one remaining

claim—for breach of contract—for failure to state a claim. Under California law,

“performance by the plaintiff or excuse for nonperformance” is a necessary

element for a breach of contract claim. First Commercial Mortg. Co. v. Reece, 108

Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 33 (Ct. App. 2001). Marquez cannot satisfy this element because

she nowhere alleges that she made the payments required of her under the deed of

trust. Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with certain notice requirements in the Page 3 of 3 notice of default cannot excuse Marquez’s failure leading up to that point to make

payments on the loan, despite receiving the benefit of the loan agreement.

3. Marquez argues that the district court erred in taking judicial notice of

various documents setting forth the record chain of title for the property. But the

only documents necessary to the court’s decision—the deed of trust and the two

assignments—were also attached to the complaint. The order dismissing the

complaint thus properly relied on the allegations in the complaint and the

documents attached to it. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th

Cir. 2003).

4. Finally, Marquez argues that defendants violated her due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim was not raised in the district court

and is therefore forfeited. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.

2009). Even if it had been raised in the district court, the claim would fail because

“California’s nonjudicial foreclosure procedure does not constitute state action and

is therefore immune from the procedural due process requirements of the federal

Constitution.” Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 925, 933 (Cal. 1978) (in

bank); see also Apao v. Bank of New York, 324 F.3d 1091, 1094–95 (9th Cir.

2003).

AFFIRMED.