facts, we agree that the agents had reasonable suspicion at that point to believe

Onofre lacked lawful status and so could detain her for further investigation. See

Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1357(a)(1).

3. Onofre’s subsequent detention was not unreasonable in duration or in

scope. Such a detention “may last only so long as is necessary to carry out its

purpose and the investigative methods used should be the least intrusive means

reasonably available to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicion.” Martinez v.

Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the IJ found that the agents

handcuffed Onofre and detained her in the parking lot “between 30 minutes and 1

hour.” Under the circumstances, neither the length of the detention nor the use of

handcuffs was improper. See United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir.

2001); United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).

Similarly, as the IJ correctly concluded, the agents’ actions were not so coercive as

to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v.

Carr, 761 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).

3 4. For the same reasons, suppression was not warranted for regulatory

violations, as the agents here did not violate the two regulations at issue. The first

regulation provides that an agent may question an individual regarding her

immigration status only if the agent “has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific

articulable facts, that the person being questioned is, or is attempting to be,

engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the United

States.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2). As noted above, the agents did have reasonable

suspicion that Onofre lacked lawful status. The second regulation prohibits “[t]he

use of threats, coercion, or physical abuse . . . to induce a suspect to waive his or

her rights or to make a statement.” Id. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii). Again, Onofre was not

threatened, abused, or otherwise coerced during her detention in the parking lot.

5. The events occurring after Onofre’s detention in the parking lot are

not pertinent to her motion to suppress, as the evidence Onofre provided there was

sufficient to prove removability. That evidence would not be considered a fruit of

any improper actions that took place later on and so would not be suppressible on

that basis. See United States v. McClendon, 713 F.3d 1211, 1217–18 (9th Cir.

2013).

PETITION DENIED.

4