facts on which it is based. Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 2013),

abrogated on other grounds by Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017).

In her original pro se petition, Ram raised claims that her pleas of guilty and

not guilty by reason of insanity were not knowing and voluntary because she was

incompetent to plead when she made them and because her trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to have her competency evaluated. In her

amended petition, she asserts that her not guilty by reason of insanity plea was not

knowing and voluntary because it was made without a factual basis—that it was,

unknown to her, a fiction invented by her trial counsel to have her committed for

mental health treatment. For the same reason, she argues that her trial lawyer was

ineffective.

The facts underlying Ram’s original claims have to do with her ability to

understand the trial process and the rights she was giving up when she entered her

pleas. Her new claims, on the other hand, require inquiry into whether the acts she

admitted committing constitute the crime of attempted murder. The relevant facts

for the two sets of claims are entirely distinct. While her new claims, like her old

ones, implicate what she knew and understood at the time of her pleas, her new Page 3 of 3

claims ultimately depend on the adequacy of the evidence supporting her plea to

attempted murder. The claims therefore do not share a common core of operative

facts, and the amended petition does not relate back to the date of the original.

AFFIRMED.