DISCUSSION

1. RICO

To maintain a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant

engaged in: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of

racketeering activity and, additionally, must establish that (5) the defendant caused

injury to plaintiff’s business or property.” Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300

F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c)).

At issue is whether Appellants have sufficiently alleged an injury to

property. Appellants argue they maintain a property interest in their workers’

compensation benefits prior to a final award of benefits. We disagree. “[T]he right

to [California] workers’ compensation benefits is ‘wholly statutory,’ and such

3 rights are not vested until they are ‘reduced to final judgment.’”1 Angelotti

Chiropractic, Inc.v. Baker, 791 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Graczyk

v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Appellants’ RICO claims.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the

deprivation of “a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,”

and (2) “that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color

of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Appellants’ § 1983 claim is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. “The first inquiry in every due process challenge is

whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or

‘liberty.’ ” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).

1 Appellants Brayshaw and Viola alleged injury to a property right because they alleged that they were awarded workers’ compensation benefits in the form of a final judgment and Appellees delayed or denied issuing benefits pursuant to their judgments. However, their RICO claims still fail because they did not sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity. See Durning v. Citibank, Int’l, 990 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011); Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1019, 1229 (9th Cir. 2004).

4 Again, Appellants fail to establish any property interest in their workers’

compensation benefits prior to a final award of benefits.2 Angelotti, 791 F.3d at

1081. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. §1983

claims.

3. State Law Claims

Finally, we find the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA preempts

Appellants’ IIED and UCL claims. Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp.

Ins. Fund, 14 P. 3d 234, 244-45 (Cal. 2001). Appellants’ alleged injury is “a

normal part of the [workers’ compensation] claims process.” Id. at 250 (citing

Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 774 P.2d 762, 767 (Cal. 1989)).

Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellants’ state law claims

pursuant to the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA.

AFFIRMED.

2 Although Appellants Brayshaw and Viola alleged injury to a property right, their § 1983 claims fail because they did not sufficiently allege that Appellees’ violations were committed pursuant to “a policy, practice or custom of the entity.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 5