dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The alternative of affirming testimony (as distinguished from swearing to it) has been provided for all witnesses who, for religious or other reasons, object to oath taking. See United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 , 1406 n. 2, 1407 (4th Cir.1969); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 969-70 (D.C.Cir.1950); Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 603 (“This rule is designed to afford the flexibility required in dealing with religious adults, athiests, conscientious objectors, mental defectives and children.”); 6 Wig-more on Evidence §§ 1815-1829; Weinstein’s Evidence 11603[1]. Cf. Moore v. United States, 348 U.S. 966 , 75 S.Ct. 530 , 99 L.Ed. 753 (1955) (per curiam) (affirmation need not include the word “solemn” if objected to on religious grounds). 1

Appellant seeks to assert claimed rights in the federal courts. He should not be permitted to disregard reasonable Federal Rules of Procedure because of his insistence, however sincere, that his esoteric interpretation of one of those rules must prevail over the interpretation established by the federal courts. 2

*1402 Appellant’s demand trivializes the vital purposes of the free exercise clause. Moreover, yielding to appellant’s demand in this case tends to invite demands for special formulations in future cases and thus cause needless delay in the administration of justice. 3

The trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s action should be affirmed.

. The majority’s reliance on Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir.1984) is, it seems to me, not well taken. The objection on religious grounds in that case was to the requirement of obtaining a Social Security number in order to receive public assistance benefits. No alternative was provided to that requirement.

. Neither of the statements approved by the majority satisfies an important purpose of requiring oath or affirmation, i.e., to insure that the witness makes a conscious commitment to tell the truth. (See Looper, supra; Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, at 387 (10th Cir.1956), ce rt. denied, 351 U.S. 943 , 76 S.Ct. 834 , 100 L.Ed. 1469 (1957); A Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement: Securing Truth in the Twentieth Century, 75 Mich.L.R. 1681 (1977).) To say that "I understand that I must tell the truth” or that "I understand I must accurately state the facts” is not a promise to tell the truth nor accurately to state the facts. Appellant was aware of this as shown by his statements at oral argument that

. The majority treats the trial court’s action as an abuse of discretion relating to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 which provides for sanctions. The question in this case relates to the interpretation of Fed. R.Civ.P. 43(d) which provides for affirmation. Even if the trial court erred, that would be reversible as an error of law, not an abuse of discretion. The majority, by accepting alternative language as complying with Rule 43(d), imposes no sanction. It simply holds there is no basis for any sanction so long as appellant accepts the language approved by the majority.