facts sufficient to show that Seterus’s conduct was unfair or unconscionable. See

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (prohibiting unfair or unconscionable conduct in enforcing a

security interest); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir.

2017) (discussing protections for borrowers set forth in § 1692f(6)); see also

2 17-56907 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Grant’s cancellation of instrument

claim because Grant failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3412 (grounds for cancellation of

a written instrument).

The district court properly dismissed Grant’s claim against Seterus under

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) because it was derivative of her

§ 1692f(6) claim. See Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 832, 856 (Ct. App. 2014) (“To state a cause of action based on an

unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law.”).

We do not consider Grant’s claim under California’s Homeowner’s Bill of

Rights because Grant failed to replead it in her operative complaint. See Lacey v.

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with leave

to amend are waived if not repled).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

3 17-56907 in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

4 17-56907