facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “highly deferential” and “difficult to meet.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 105 (2011) (citation omitted). “Section

2254(d) applies even where,” as here, “there has been a summary denial” by the

state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187 (2011).

Bryant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury

instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. However,

in rejecting Bryant’s similar claim on direct appeal that the trial court should have

sua sponte instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter, the California Court of

Appeal determined that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not

warranted, as a matter of state law, because the evidence reflected that Bryant

committed at least felony assault with a deadly weapon. See People v. Bryant, 129

Cal. Rptr. 3d 808, 819-22 (Ct. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 301 P.3d 1136

2 (Cal. 2013); see also People v. Bryant, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 499 n.4 (Ct. App.

2013). We are bound by this legal interpretation of California law. See Bradshaw

v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (“We have repeatedly held that a

state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal

of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).

Given the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the evidence did

not legally support involuntary manslaughter under any theory, Bryant cannot

show that her trial counsel was deficient or that she was prejudiced by the failure to

request an involuntary manslaughter instruction. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (providing the standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “trial

counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection”).

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Bryant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

AFFIRMED.

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