facts that demonstrate a fair probability that a search of Kuzmin’s home would

produce evidence of the crime of being a felon in possession. See Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Nora, 765 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir.

2014). Kuzmin’s past convictions are relevant to show that Kuzmin is a felon, a

necessary element of the crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), not to show he had

firearms in the house. Because the search warrant affidavit established that

Kuzmin had constructive possession of the firearms due to his “knowledge of the

weapons and the power and intent to exercise control over them,” United States v.

Vasquez, 654 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2011), the ATF did not need direct evidence

that Kuzmin had been seen holding the firearms.

2 The district court’s above-Guidelines sentence was not substantively

unreasonable, because the court reasonably determined that Kuzmin’s criminal

history score did not reflect the seriousness of his record, his past convictions

showed that he had a violent temper and a substance abuse problem, he had been

undeterred by past sentences, and he refused to accept responsibility. The district

court did not impermissibly base its sentence upon Kuzmin’s statements at

sentencing; rather, it noted in passing that his statements further supported the

district court’s concern that he failed to accept responsibility, which is an

appropriate ground for imposing a harsher sentence. See United States v. Carter,

804 F.2d 508, 514–15 (9th Cir. 1986).

AFFIRMED.

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