dissenting:

The majority concludes that Sorrels’s proposed interpretation of Title II of the Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-250, §§ 201-213, 92 Stat. 163 (Redwood Act), is reasonable and, therefore, that an employee who voluntarily leaves employment “in accurate anticipation of inevitable loss of work” has been “laid off” within the meaning of the Redwood Act. I disagree.

The Redwood Act provides that if there are two reasonable interpretations of a provision, the Secretary must adopt the interpretation that is most favorable to the employees as a class. Redwood Act § 213(f). I find the Secretary’s interpretation reasonable. Thus, the critical question is whether Sorrels proposes an interpretation that is reasonable. Barnes v. Donovan, 720 F.2d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1983). If Sorrels’s interpretation is “beyond the plain meaning” of the involved section of the Redwood Act, it is not reasonable. Hoehn v. Donovan, 711 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.1983) (Hoehn).

The majority relies on Local 3-98, International Woodworkers of America v. Donovan, 713 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.1983) (Local 3-98), to support Sorrels’s interpretation of the Redwood Act. Local 3-98, however, does not help resolve the issue before us. In Local 3-98, we held that it was a reasonable interpretation of section 203 that an employee who has suffered a layoff during the window period retains his affected status notwithstanding later employment with another affected employer. Id. at 439-40 . Local 3-98 does not, however, suggest that the affected employee need not meet the additional eligibility requirement of section 205(b) that limits benefits to “each week of total or partial layoff.” In Local 3-98, we did not examine the eligibility provision of section 205(b). That is the critical provision in this case.

The majority also relies on language in Local 3-98 that suggests employees who are laid off and then accept work with an affected employer should not be treated differently than employees who find employment outside the industry. Id. at 440 . But that language cannot be relied on to modify the plain meaning of the Redwood Act, see Hoehn, 711 F.2d at 901 ; Rains v. Donovan, 702 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir.1983) (Rains), or to extend benefits to individuals that Congress never intended to be compensated. See Lanning v. Marshall, 650 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.1981). In Local 3-98, we premised our discussion of the potential for unequal treatment on the fact that Congress’s principal concern was to compensate displaced workers for job loss. Local 3-98, 713 F.2d at 440 . An individual who voluntarily quits work to accept better employment is not displaced. Consequently, the worker should not receive the benefits of the Redwood Act. Cf. Cavender v. Donovan, 752 F.2d 1376, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (individual who voluntarily quit for personal reasons not entitled to benefits).

The language of section 205(b) is very clear: a partial or total layoff is a prerequisite to receiving benefits. Sorrels’s interpretation of the term “layoff” to include an employee who voluntary quit because he anticipated an inevitable loss of work is beyond the plain meaning of the Redwood Act and unreasonable. I foresee serious problems with Sorrels’s proposed interpretation because it would permit affected employees to quit work and claim benefits based not on a layoff, but rather on their predictions that a layoff might occur sometime in the future. Such an expansive interpretation of the Redwood Act is both unwarranted and unreasonable. Cf. Rains, 702 F.2d at 184 (rejecting expansive interpretation of section 201(9) because of specific and narrow language of the Act).

Interestingly enough, had he remained working for Giannandrea, Sorrels could have continued working for the normal length of the season. Additionally, there is no finding that he could not have continued *910 working for Giannandrea during the following season. I therefore have some doubt that there was demonstrated an “inevitable loss of work” that Sorrels “accurately anticipated.”

I also disagree with the majority’s reading of Ladd v. Kirk, No. SF-REPP-14208 (D.O.L. Feb. 6, 1985) (Kirk), and In the Matter of Donovan W. Tolman, No. SF-REPP-12882 (D.O.L. Apr. 30, 1985) (Tolman ). In Kirk, the Secretary specifically stated that his reasoning applied only to those situations in which the affected employee had quit temporary employment. Tolman also emphasized that the employee was only temporarily employed. Sorrels never alleged that his employment with Giannandrea was temporary. Thus, Kirk and Tolman are distinguishable. I would interpret Kirk and Tolman to mean that a person who accepts temporary employment after being laid off continues to be laid off for the purposes of sections 201(12) and 205(b) because the worker has never been permanently reemployed. Consequently, the affected employee can still receive benefits based on the first layoff even though the worker voluntarily quits temporary employment.

This case involves a statutory scheme that is designed to compensate displaced workers for job loss resulting from Redwood Park expansion. The majority, however, has ignored the controlling language of the Redwood Act and adopted an interpretation of the term “layoff” that is beyond the plain meaning of the Redwood Act and, therefore, is unreasonable. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.