facts are sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Higuera’s admission

and waiver of the revocation hearing were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

2. The district court plainly erred by imposing a 20-month sentence for

the purpose of allowing Higuera to participate in the Bureau of Prisons’

Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S.

319, 332 (2011) (holding that the sentencing statute “precludes sentencing courts

from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s

rehabilitation”); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 282 (9th Cir. 2011)

2 (applying Tapia to sentences imposed for violations of supervised release

conditions).

The district court’s only explanation for its sentence was that it was intended

“to allow [Higuera] correctional treatment; in particular, the RDAP program.”

This is little different than the explanation the Supreme Court found improper in

Tapia. See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 322. Though the district court’s colloquy here was

acceptable, it erred when it justified the term of Higuera’s sentence based on his

ability to secure rehabilitative services. See id. at 335. The error affected

Higuera’s substantial rights because the district court’s improper focus on

imposing a sentence sufficiently long to allow Higuera to participate in RDAP

gives rise to a reasonable probability that he would have otherwise received a

lesser sentence. United States v. Tapia, 665 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011)

(where the district judge’s on-the-record comments confirmed that “the need to

provide treatment was one of the considerations that affect[ed] the length of the

sentence he imposed,” the defendant demonstrated “that there [was] a reasonable

probability that [he or she] would have received a different sentence but for the

district judge’s impermissible consideration of this factor” and “also demonstrated

that this error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grant, 664 F.3d

at 279, 282 (vacating, on plain error review, a sentence imposed in violation of

3 Tapia). We therefore vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for

resentencing.1

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, REMANDED.

1 In light of our disposition, we do not address Higuera’s argument that the 20-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.

4