facts.” Id. at 2557.

The state court decision upholding § 667.61(d)(2) was not “contrary to” or

“an unreasonable application of” Johnson. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As California

courts have explained, the language in the third prong of § 667.61(d)(2)’s test

requires factfinders to consider the particular facts of the case at hand—not to

imagine hypothetical or typical cases of rape or forcible oral copulation. See, e.g.,

People v. Dominguez, 140 P.3d 866, 873–74 (Cal. 2006); People v. Daniels, 459

P.2d 225, 238 (Cal. 1969); People v. Ledesma, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 539–40 (Ct. Page 3 of 3

App. 2017). And to the extent that People v. Jones, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506, 521 (Ct.

App. 1997), suggests otherwise, its reasoning conflicts with the California

Supreme Court’s decisions in Dominguez and Daniels. Accordingly, given the

particularized nature of § 667.61(d)(2)’s test, the state court reasonably rejected

Villegas’ claim under Johnson.

Section 667.61(d)(2) also provided Villegas with fair notice that his

particular conduct fell within the statute’s reach. A reasonable person in Villegas’

position would know that moving the victims from a bus stop at a major

intersection to an unfamiliar residential neighborhood at night would substantially

increase the risk of harm to them. See Dominguez, 140 P.3d at 874–85 (holding

that a defendant’s movement of a victim to a more isolated area significantly

“decreas[ed] the possibility of detection, escape or rescue” and substantially

increased the risk of harm).

AFFIRMED.