facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Tamplin v.

Muniz, 894 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2)).

We review the “last reasoned state court opinion,” here, the decision of the Idaho

Court of Appeals. Id.

At a hearing in state court on June 9, 2011, Appellant made what appeared to

be a request for self-representation. Rather than proceed with a Faretta colloquy, the

Court was concerned about Appellant’s ability to represent himself and ordered a

competency evaluation.

The Court’s concern with Appellant’s competence to represent himself

continued until a hearing on November 26, 2012, when Appellant’s counsel

informed the Court, in Appellant’s presence, that Appellant did not want to proceed

pro se. On the morning of trial two weeks later, Appellant requested that he be tried

in absentia, stating “I’ll trust [counsel’s] abilities to defend me.”

Appellant appealed his conviction to the Idaho Court of Appeals, arguing that

2 18-35196 the trial court denied him his constitutional right to self-representation. In denying

his appeal, the appellate court found that Appellant’s initial request to proceed pro

se was equivocal, and alternatively that prior to trial he waived and abandoned his

request to proceed pro se. Appellant then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court,

which denied his petition for review in a summary order. On habeas review in federal

court, the district court held that the Idaho Court of Appeals reached an objectively

reasonable decision on the self-representation issue.

Appellant challenges the state court’s finding that the June 9, 2011

self-representation request was equivocal. Appellant also contests the state court’s

determination that he subsequently waived or abandoned his Faretta right and the

finding that he was not competent to represent himself. Regardless of whether the

June 9, 2011 request was equivocal, Appellant waived that request during the

November 26, 2012 hearing. At that hearing, Appellant’s attorney informed the trial

court that Appellant did not want to proceed pro se, but instead wanted another

attorney. The appellate court determined that Appellant’s failure to refute the

statement withdrew his pending request to proceed pro se and waived any previous

requests made up to that point.1

1 The court further held that Appellant abandoned his subsequent request to proceed pro se by failing to pursue it when the trial court addressed pretrial matters and instead endorsed his attorney’s ability to adequately represent him in his absence.

3 18-35196 The Idaho court did not make an unreasonable determination of the facts

regarding Appellant’s waiver of his Faretta request. “[O]nce a defendant has stated

his request clearly and unequivocally and the judge has denied it in a[n] equally clear

and unequivocal fashion, the defendant is under no obligation to renew the motion.”

United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 523 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Brown v. Wainwright,

665 F.2d 607, 612 (5th Cir. 1982)). However, when a request to proceed pro se has

not been clearly and conclusively denied and the question of self-representation is

left open for possible further consideration, the right may be waived through

subsequent conduct. Brown, 665 F.2d at 611. Accordingly, since a Faretta request

can be subsequently waived, and since Appellant’s conduct indicated he had

abandoned his request to proceed pro se, the Idaho court did not violate clearly

established federal law.

AFFIRMED.

4 18-35196