facts and circumstances. Accordingly, this is not a situation in which “there [was]

nothing in [the] claim to suggest it was filed in anything other than” Jane’s

representative capacity. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 650,

661–62 & n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff could not pursue a

survival cause of action because her claim “did not identify any damages

recoverable by the estate”). Instead, the claim provided the County and State with

adequate information to investigate Jane’s wrongful death cause of action.

The claim did not, however, notify the County and State of Mindy’s and

Jason’s wrongful death cause of action. Children cannot receive loss of

consortium damages under California law, Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d

858, 865 (Cal. 1977), and the claim contained no indication that Mindy and Jason

were seeking damages in their individual capacities, see Nelson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

661–62.

2. The Sakamotos also appeal from the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to the County on their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We

affirm.

Relying on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,

489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Sakamotos argue that the County violated the Fourteenth

Amendment for two reasons. First, they allege that the County had a constitutional Page 4 of 5

duty to protect Gerald under DeShaney’s “special relationship” exception. See id.

at 201–02. But this exception applies only when a county fails to protect someone

in its custody, Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2011), and

Gerald was not in the County’s custody at the time of his death.

Second, the Sakamotos contend that the County exhibited deliberate

indifference to “a known or obvious danger” by releasing Gerald from the jail in a

vulnerable medical state. See id. at 974 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even

after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Sakamotos, we find no

evidence in the record to support this claim. The nurses who evaluated Gerald had

no reason to suspect that he was unable to care for himself, nor did any other

County employee who interacted with him during his time at the jail. The record

also does not support a finding that Melvalisa Rodell—the operator who Jane

allegedly informed about Gerald’s medical needs—exhibited deliberate

indifference to his health or safety. To the contrary, Rodell testified that by the

time of Gerald’s incarceration she had memorized the phone number for the

Medical Command Center and that, had Jane told her about Gerald’s mental health

issues, she would have given Jane the number.

Even if a jury found that Rodell failed to give Jane this number, there is no

evidence to suggest that Rodell did so deliberately. See id. (explaining that an

individual acts with deliberate indifference when she “actually intend[s] to expose Page 5 of 5

the plaintiff to [known] risks”). As a result, the district court properly dismissed

the Sakamotos’ claims against the individual County officials.

Because the Sakamotos cannot show that a County official committed an

underlying constitutional violation, the County itself cannot be held liable under

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Gibson v. County of

Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.