Hayes appeals from his conviction for prescribing Schedule II drugs to patients in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) (the Act). He contends that the jury was improperly instructed and that the government should not have been allowed to introduce in evidence his office records secured pursuant to search warrants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

I

Hayes is a physician and treats patients at his offices in Porterville, Farmersville, and Ivanhoe, California. After receiving information that Hayes was prescribing medication in violation of the Act, agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration obtained warrants from a federal magistrate to search Hayes’s three offices. The agents executed the search warrants and seized over 200 medical files.

Hayes then instituted a civil action for the return of the records, alleging that the issued warrants were unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court in the civil action concluded that the warrants were overbroad and ordered all of the seized records and documents to be returned unless Hayes was indicted by February 1, 1983. On January 28, 1983, a federal grand jury indicted Hayes on 640 counts of prescribing Schedule II drugs to his patients in violation of the Act. The indictment focused on Hayes’s treatment of 20 patients over a three-year period; each prescription of a Schedule II drug constituted a separate count.

Prior to trial, Hayes moved to suppress the evidence seized from his offices on the basis that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrants and that the warrants were general, overbroad, and violated the fourth amendment. A different district judge denied his motion and held, contrary to the decision by the judge in the civil action, that the warrants were not overbroad. Hayes never argued that the decision by the court in the civil action collaterally estopped the court in the criminal action from considering the validity of the warrant. Therefore, we will not consider that issue on appeal. See United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 , 100 S.Ct. 480 , 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979); Mahoney v. United States, 420 F.2d 253, 255 (D.C.Cir.1969).

After an eight-week trial, the jury returned convictions on 281 counts. Hayes was sentenced to three years in prison with a consecutive three-year term of probation and was fined $100,000.

II

Hayes contends that the district court’s initial and supplemental jury instructions were erroneous. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a defense theory if the theory has a basis in law and *1351 in the record. See United States v. Coin, 753 F.2d 1510, 1511 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam). The adequacy of the jury instructions, however, is determined by examining the instructions as a whole. See United States v. Wellington, 754 F.2d 1457, 1463 (9th Cir.) (Wellington), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 593 , 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985). “[I]t is not error to refuse a proposed instruction so long as the other instructions in their entirety cover that theory.” United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 , 101 S.Ct. 3059 , 69 L.Ed.2d 425 (1981).

The district court has broad discretion in formulating the instructions and need not give an instruction in the precise language proposed by the defendant. See United States v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.1985). “Imperfectly formulated jury instructions will serve as a basis for overturning a conviction only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.” Wellington, 754 F.2d at 1463 .

A.

Hayes contends that the initial jury instructions concerning the elements of the offense with which he was charged were misleading. The court instructed the jury that the government must prove that Hayes “knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposefully intending to violate the law.” The court read to the jury the relevant part of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and then instructed them that in order to convict Hayes they

The questions raised before us pertain to the fourth element. The court instructed the jury about the meaning of good faith:

Hayes contends that these instructions are misleading and contrary to our holding in United States v. Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir.) (Boettjer), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 , 98 S.Ct. 1627 , 56 L.Ed.2d 71 (1978). In Boettjer , we reviewed a jury instruction which stated that to convict a physician of distributing Schedule II drugs in violation of the Act, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prescription was issued “other than in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose and in accordance with the medical standards generally recognized and accepted in the medical profession.” Id. at 1081 (emphasis in original). We expressed concern in Boettjer that the jury could have interpreted this instruction in three conflicting ways, but concluded that there was no persuasive showing of actual prejudice and that a more precise instruction would not have altered the jury’s deliberations. Id. at 1081-83 .

Hayes raises a similar argument here. He contends that the instructions given permitted the jury to convict him if he acted in good faith but failed to conform to standard medical practices — that is, a conviction based on negligence. Hayes’s argu *1352 ment is weighty only if we read in isolation the instruction which states that a prescription must have been issued “other than in good faith, for a legitimate medical purpose, in the usual course of his professional practice.” Jury instructions, however, must be viewed as a whole in the context of the entire trial. See Wellington, 754 F.2d at 1463 . In light of the district court’s jury instructions on specific intent and good faith, we fail to see how the jury could interpret the instructions as permitting a finding of guilt based on mere negligence. Indeed, we rejected this very argument in Boettjer after concluding that “[i]t strains belief to imagine that the jury could have been misled into finding the defendant guilty if his actions were in accordance with medical standards.” Boettjer, 569 F.2d at 1082 (emphasis in original). We emphasized that any possible confusion was eliminated by later instructions dealing with good faith and its relationship to standards of medical practice. Id. at 1082 . Although more precise language could have been used, we reach the same conclusion in this case.

The court also instructed the jury about the Act’s prohibition against prescribing Schedule II drugs for detoxification and maintenance of addiction:

Hayes argues that this is improper “because it imposes an objective test as to both the existence of a medical complaint and the appropriateness of treatment.” The instruction, however, properly states the law. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (c) (1985). If a patient were a narcotic addict and the only medical complaint was addiction or withdrawal, Hayes could not have issued the drugs in good faith. The instruction refers only to “a medical complaint other than addiction or withdrawal” as a proper basis for prescribing a Schedule II drug to a drug addict. Any vagueness in the instruction favored Hayes since section 1306.07(c) permits prescribing narcotic drugs to narcotic addicts only for “intractable pain in which no relief or cure is possible or none has been found after reasonable efforts.” Id.

Without doubt, the instructions could have been improved. When viewed as a whole, however, the initial jury instructions given by the district court relating to both the elements of a section 841(a)(1) violation and the Act’s medical exception were sufficient. But Hayes further contends that even if the initial instructions correctly stated the law, they were confusing, and that the district court compounded the confusion in its supplemental instructions to the jury.

B.

While deliberating, the jury submitted four substantive questions to the district court. Hayes contends that the court’s responses misstated the medical exception and thus created additional confusion concerning the necessary elements for a conviction under section 841(a). We have stated that “ ‘[t]he necessity, extent and character of additional instructions are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 631 (9th Cir.1979) (Collom), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 , 100 S.Ct. 1862 , 64 L.Ed.2d 278 (1980), quoting Wilson v. United States, 422 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir.1970). At the same time, the district court has the responsibility to eliminate confusion when a jury asks for clarification of a particular issue. See United States v. McCall, 592 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 , 99 S.Ct. 2061 , 60 L.Ed.2d 665 (1979).

The jury first asked:

The district court answered the jury: “If Dr. Hayes prescribed the drugs in good faith for legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice and did not prescribe them for drug maintenance or addiction he is not guilty.” Hayes agreed to the court’s supplemental instruction, except that he felt the “did not prescribe them for drug maintenance or addiction” language was confusing since the jury’s question assumed that he did not do so. This contention is meritless, for the court’s answer plainly incorporates the question’s assumption.

The jury next asked: “If we find a patient was an addict and the doctor treated his addiction with Sched[ule] II drugs, and the patient experienced chronic pain, and the doctor treated the chronic pain in a good faith effort, how would we find— guilty or not guilty?” The court answered:

Hayes objected on the ground that under Boettjer the answer should have been “not guilty.” We disagree. An answer of “not guilty” might have misled the jury into believing that Hayes could treat addiction with Schedule II drugs, which he could not do. Consequently, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in not answering the jury’s question directly. The court’s restatement of the initial instruction was adequate. See Collom, 614 F.2d at 631 .

The jury then asked: “Is it legal for any physician to prescribe Schedule II drugs to relieve pain for as long a time as the physician believes the pain to be present?” The judge answered: “Not always. The physician must weigh the risk of addiction against the benefits (and see the answer to other questions).” Hayes’s counsel acknowledged that the weighing of the risk of addiction versus the benefits of a Schedule II drug was relevant. He argued, however, that the jury should also be specifically instructed that the duration of a prescription alone-does not make the prescription illegal. We see no error in the court’s refusal to give this additional instruction since the court’s response to the jury’s inquiry adequately referred the jury to the relevant considerations.

Lastly, the jury asked:

The court answered: “The existence of pain is not the only question involved. The jury must determine whether or not the Doctor in good faith believed that a painful condition existed that warranted the prescription of Schedule II drugs for the period of time and dosages involved.” Hayes argues that this obscures the subjective element of Hayes’s good faith by suggesting that pain must exist. The court’s answer, however, clearly stated that pain is not the only consideration and that the jury must determine if the physician in good faith believed that pain existed. Hayes also argues that use of the term “warranted the prescription” suggested to the jury that an objective test should be applied. When read in context that term refers only *1354 to the doctor’s subjective good faith. There was no error.

C.

Hayes raises two other arguments related to the jury instructions. He contends that the instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. We disagree. The jury instructions clearly stated that “the Government has the burden of proving every element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt” and that the “burden never shifts to the defendant.”

Hayes also contends that section 841(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied. Hayes admits that the facial validity of section 841(a)(1) has been upheld against attacks for vagueness. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 , 96 S.Ct. 335, 346 , 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 197-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 , 96 S.Ct. 562 , 46 L.Ed.2d 404 (1975). He contends, however, that the statute is vague as applied in this case because of erroneous jury instructions that “exacerbated” potentially ambiguous language in the statute. We have concluded that the initial and supplemental instructions were not erroneous. Thus, we reject Hayes’s argument that the circumstances of this case caused section 841(a)(1) to be unconstitutionally vague as applied.

III

Hayes contends that the warrants for the search of his three offices were facially overbroad and authorized a general search and seizure in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. The district court concluded that any lack of particularity in the warrants was eliminated by the affidavits submitted in support of the warrants and, alternatively, that the general description in the warrants was permissible because a more precise description was not possible. We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the warrants were not facially overbroad. See United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir.1984) (McClintock), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 75 , 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985).

The fourth amendment requires that “warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized [and] makes general searches under them impossible.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S.Ct. 74, 76 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). The particularity requirement ensures that “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Id.; see United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336,1339 (9th Cir.1982) (Hillyard). A warrant need only be reasonably specific in its description of the objects of the search and need not be elaborately detailed. See United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1811 , 1322 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 , 103 S.Ct. 1271 , 75 L.Ed.2d 493 (1983). Thus, when probable cause exists, “all items in a set of files may be inspected during a search, provided that sufficiently specific guidelines for identifying the documents sought are provided in the search warrant and are followed by the officers conducting the search.” United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir.1982) (Tamura).

A.

We first examine whether the government’s affidavits can be considered in determining if the warrant lacked particularity. An affidavit may be relied on to provide the requisite particularity in an otherwise overbroad warrant only “if (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and (2) the warrant uses suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit therein.” Hillyard, 677 F.2d at 1340 ; see United States v. Property Belonging to Talk of the Town Bookstore, Inc., 644 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.1981) (Talk of the Town Bookstore).

Here, it is disputed whether the warrants adequately incorporated the affidavits by reference, but it is clear that the affidavits did not accompany the warrants. The district court concluded that the government’s affidavits could “be used to supply any particularity which may be *1355 missing from the warrant,” and that the requirement that an affidavit accompany the warrant is relevant only to a challenge that a search is overbroad. We disagree. The purpose of the accompanying affidavit clarifying a warrant is both to limit the officer’s discretion and to inform the person subject to the search what items the officers executing the warrant can seize. Talk of the Town Bookstore, 644 F.2d at 1319 . If the needed affidavits are not attached to the warrant, then neither purpose is served. Consequently, in this case the affidavits may not be considered in determining whether the warrant is facially overbroad.

B.

We now examine whether the warrant on its face is overbroad and in violation of the fourth amendment. The magistrate issued three warrants, one for each of Hayes’s offices, that authorized the officers to seize

Hayes contends that the warrants are overbroad on their face because they permitted the officers to examine thousands of patient files. The number of files that could be scrutinized, however, is not determinative. The search and seizure of large quantities of material is justified if the material is within the scope of the probable cause underlying the warrant. McClintock, 748 F.2d at 1283 ; United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 653 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 , 104 S.Ct. 2360 , 80 L.Ed.2d 831 (1984); United States v. Offices Known As 50 State Distributing Co., 708 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1983) (50 State), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 , 104 S.Ct. 1272 , 79 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

The magistrate found probable cause to issue the warrants based on an affidavit that described a complaint by one patient, statements by an undercover officer, testimony by one of Hayes’s receptionists, and testimony of a medical consultant who reviewed Hayes’s prescription records for Schedule II drugs at 15 pharmacies in Tulare County, California, and concluded that there was a high probability that Hayes “caused, abetted, or prolonged addi[c]tion or habituation to controlled substances.” The magistrate found probable cause to seize all controlled substances and all records that related to the procuring, transferring, administering, prescribing, or dispensing of controlled substances. On appeal, Hayes does not challenge this determination of probable cause. The fact that the officers discovered, upon arrival at the three offices, that there were over 10,-000 patient files does not detract from the magistrate’s initial finding of probable cause.

*1356 Hayes also contends that the warrant failed to provide standards for the officers to distinguish between those files the officers could seize and those they could not and that the warrants should have been more narrowly drawn. We disagree. In searches of this nature “some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 , 482 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 2749 n. 11, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (.Andresen). Here, the officers were limited in their seizure to documents dealing with the distribution of controlled substances. 3 The warrants did not permit them to seize any documents unrelated to controlled substances. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir.1983), ce rt. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 , 104 S.Ct. 1593 , 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). Where, as here, there are articulated standards that “reasonably guide the officers in avoiding the seizure of protected property, a search warrant authorizing such seizure is not a general warrant.” United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir.1984); see Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2749 n. 11; Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595 ; United States v. Federbush, 625 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 , 99 S.Ct. 257 , 58 L.Ed.2d 243 (1978). The fact that the officers did not seize all of the materials permitted by the warrant does not mean that they possessed the type of unfettered discretion that violates the fourth amendment.

We also conclude that the warrants need not have been more narrowly drawn. Hayes contends that the officers possessed information concerning 58 cases of potential violations involving Schedule II drugs and that the warrants should have been limited to those 58 patient files. Such a conclusion, however, ignores the magistrate’s finding, unchallenged on appeal, of probable cause to seize all documents concerning controlled substances. 4 The 58 known cases could fairly be considered as representative of more pervasive violations of the Act. See 50 State, 708 F.2d at 1374-75 .

AFFIRMED.

. In two of the warrants, this provision read: "patient logs, appointment books and other records and ledgers reflecting patient visits to Dr. Hayes or his employees, constituting evidence of illegal distribution of controlled substances."

. The dissent states that the United States attorney admitted at oral argument that he did not draft or review the warrants or affidavits and that such a failure was a departure from normal office procedures. Dissent, p. 1357, n. 1. The United States attorney, however, also stated that he assisted in drafting the warrants and affidavits. The only departure from normal office procedures was his failure to review the final drafts of the affidavits and warrants before they were submitted to the magistrate.

. The dissent contends that we have failed to consider language in two of the warrants in determining if the warrants violated the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment. Dissent, p. 1357. The Farmersville and Porter-ville warrants contain language that the dissent interprets as limiting the seizure of certain records to those that constitute "evidence of illegal distribution of controlled substances." The Ivanhoe warrant contains no such limiting language. All three warrants, however, contain additional language that authorized the seizure of all records that "document the purchasing, dispensing, and prescribing [of] controlled substances.” Hayes contends, and the government concedes, that the warrants authorized the seizure of all records and documents that related to transferring, procuring, administering, prescribing, or dispensing of controlled substances. Therefore, the warrants did not require the officers to determine whether a particular item constituted "evidence of illegal distribution of controlled substances.”

. The dissent states that the United States attorney admitted during oral argument that the failure to limit the warrants to records involving Schedule II drugs was a "mistake." Dissent, p. 1357, n. 1. However, the United States attorney later argued that the warrants properly were not limited to Schedule II drugs because there was probable cause to conclude that Hayes was dispensing controlled substances in violation of the law. In any event, the United States attorney’s admission of a "mistake” in response to questioning by the court is irrelevant because the magistrate found that there was probable cause to issue the warrant with reference to controlled substances generally and not as to Schedule II drugs only.