facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact.”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that

no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts

for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).

Nor does the record allow one to infer a retaliatory motive for Burroughs’s

termination. Even assuming close temporal proximity between his workers’

compensation claim and subsequent termination,1 Burroughs still “must make some

showing sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer that the [City] was aware that

[he] had engaged in protected activity.” Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.

Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003).2 Not so here. Regardless of who ordered

his termination, Burroughs can at most point to their awareness of the supervisor’s

injury report—which, we note, cleared Burroughs for regular duty. Yet that alone

scarcely alerts one to Burroughs’s efforts to exercise his workers’ compensation

rights. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(iii); cf., e.g., Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores,

1 We are uncertain when Burroughs filed his workers’ compensation claim. Indeed, aside from the supervisor’s injury report, the pages of which bear headers “Wkr Comp Form 100-A” and “Wkr Comp Form 100-B,” the record contains no evidence of Burroughs having filed such a claim. 2 Arizona courts rely on federal case law when interpreting state employment retaliation claims. See Najar v. State, 9 P.3d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (turning to federal courts’ interpretation of Title VII retaliation claims to interpret an analogous Arizona statute).

3 Inc., 359 F. Supp. 3d 761, 797–98 (D. Ariz. 2019) (imputing knowledge where

employee filed accident report that set workers’ compensation process in motion).

The requisite knowledge is therefore lacking.

AFFIRMED.

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