Joanne Beaule Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, Civ. A. No. 84-6223
Opinion
Opinion
797 F.2d 782 41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 997 , 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,561 , 55 USLW 2151 , 34 Ed. Law Rep. 36 Joanne Beaule RUGGLES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY, San Luis Obispo, Defendant-Appellant. Civ. A. No. 84-6223. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Oct. 9, 1985. Decided Aug. 19, 1986. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 28, 1986. Henry M. Willis, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Richard M. Radosh, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before ANDERSON, FARRIS, and NELSON, Circuit Judges. FARRIS, Circuit Judge: 1 Joanne Beaule Ruggles brought this Title VII action against her former employer California Polytechnic State University. She prevailed at trial on her claim that, after she filed an EEOC complaint against Cal Poly, the university retaliated against her by eliminating a tenure-track teaching position for which she was applying. The district court awarded her $107,596 in back pay, $126,073.75 in attorney's fees, $12,958.18 in expenses, and instatement in a tenure-track position within the Art Department…
lead Opinion
Farris, J.
Joanne Beaule Ruggles brought this Title VII action against her former employer California Polytechnic State University. She prevailed at trial on her claim that, after she filed an EEOC complaint against Cal Poly, the university retaliated against her by eliminating a tenure-track teaching position for which she was applying. . The district court awarded her $107,596 in back pay, $126,073.75 in attorney’s fees, $12,-958.18 in expenses, and instatement in a tenure-track position within the Art De *784 partment at Cal Poly. Her court-ordered appointment included retroactive seniority for purposes of compensation but not for tenure. We affirm the district court’s findings that Ruggles established a prima facie case of retaliation and that the nonretaliatory reasons which Cal Poly articulated were pretextual; we reverse, however, the judgment of liability and the award of injunctive relief and damages, and remand for a new trial on the issues of damages liability and remedy.
I. FACTS
From 1973 to 1979 Ruggles worked as a part-time instructor in the Art and Architecture Departments of Cal Poly. In 1979 Cal Poly advertised for a lecturer in Basic Design and Drawing, a course offered…
concurrence Opinion
Nelson, J.
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the court’s result and much of its analysis. I write separately to clarify what I believe to be the proper allocation and order of proof, and to point out that we need not decide whether there was adequate support in the record for the district court’s finding that Ruggles would have received the 1980 Basic Design and Drawing position but for her protected activity.
In order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, 1 the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment decision. My colleagues suggest that the requisite causal link can be established only by a showing that the plaintiff would not have suffered the adverse decision but for her protected activity. See ante, at 784-785. I disagree. My understanding of Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1984), is that once the plaintiff succeeds in showing that her protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment decision, see Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.1982) (cited in Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354 ), 2 and that the employer’s proffered explanation for the adverse…