This appeal raises an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether parents subject to conflicting state child custody decrees may seek relief in federal court to determine which decree is valid and enforceable under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982) [hereinafter PKPA or section 1738A].

I

In 1979, Susan Clay Thompson (Susan) commenced proceedings in the California Superior Court for dissolution of her marriage to David A. Thompson (David) and determination of custody of their minor child Matthew. In the fall of 1979 the California court awarded the Thompsons joint custody of Matthew. In November of 1980, one or both parties initiated additional proceedings in the California court 1 which culminated in entry of the following judgment on December 4, 1980:

The court also ordered the court investigator to conduct an investigation into custody issues, to be concluded by April of 1981. On December 12,1980, Susan and Matthew moved to Louisiana with the court’s permission.

On March 24, 1981, Susan filed a petition in Louisiana state court for the filing and enforcement of the California custody decree, for judgment of custody, and for modification of David’s visitation privileges based upon allegations of child abuse and mistreatment. The Louisiana court granted Susan’s petition by order dated April 7, 1981, awarding sole custody of Matthew to Susan.

On June 15,1981, following its review of the court investigator’s report, the California court awarded sole custody of Matthew to David, and “retain[ed] jurisdiction until Petitioner’s [Susan’s] death, remarriage or further order of the court.” On August 12,1983, David filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the Central District of California. He sought an order declaring the Louisiana decree invalid, and the 1981 California decree valid, and requiring that all custody disputes be determined by the appropriate California state court until California issues a permanent custody decree. He also sought an injunction against enforcement of the Louisiana decree. The district court granted Susan’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. David appeals.

II

The district court pointed to a lack of personal jurisdiction over Susan as a ground for its dismissal of David’s complaint. Lack of personal jurisdiction would prevent us from considering the merits of David’s claims. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 , 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696 , 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir.1980).

In Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.1977), we summarized the circumstances in which personal jurisdiction will properly lie:

See also Varsic v. United States District Court, 607 F.2d 245 , 249 (9th Cir.1979).

The nature and quality of Susan’s activities in California persuade us that the requisite minimum contacts are present. First, Susan purposefully availed herself of the privilege of conducting her activities in California when she invoked the benefits and protections afforded by California law by initiating an action for dissolution and child custody. Second, David’s action for enforcement of section 1738A is directly related to Susan’s original California custody action.

Finally, we think that the exercise of jurisdiction in the Central District is reasonable in the circumstances of this case. California was Susan’s marital domicile pri- or to the dissolution of her marriage; Matthew was born in California and resided *1550 there; Susan initiated dissolution and custody proceedings in California; the dissolution was a California judgment; and the custody order which permitted Susan to relocate to Louisiana and which Susan sought to modify in Louisiana was made by the California court. See Bergan v. Bergan, 114 Cal.App.3d 567, 570-71 , 170 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1981).

III

The district court erred in dismissing David’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. David’s complaint alleges a violation of a federal statute, 28 U.S;C. § 1738A. Federal question jurisdiction exists unless the cause of action alleged is patently without merit, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70-71 , 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2628-29 , 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978), or the allegation is clearly immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 , 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). The court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief can be granted. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 , 66 S.Ct. 773, 776 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Because jurisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that the complaint might fail to state a claim upon which recovery can be had, the failure to state a valid claim is not the equivalent of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and calls for a judgment on the merits rather than for a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Rodriguez v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 703 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 , 104 S.Ct. 84 , 78 L.Ed.2d 94 (1983).

IV

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the PKPA applies to this case. Susan contends the PKPA did not become effective until July 1, 1981, and consequently does not control the Louisiana custody proceedings initiated on March 24, 1981 which culminated in the court’s judgment on April 7, 1981.

The PKPA was enacted as a part of Pub.L. No. 96-611, which provides: “The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on, and apply to services furnished on or after, July 1, 1981.” Pub.L. No. 96-611, Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act § 2, 94 Stat. 3566 , 3567 (1980). Although at first glance this provision seems dispositive, our analysis of the statute as a whole persuades us otherwise. Sections 1 through 5 and section 11 of Pub.L. No. 96-611 contain technical amendments to the Social Security Act which are unrelated to the PKPA. Moreover, the placement of the PKPA’s short title indicates that the PKPA was intended as a separate and distinct Act. The short title of the PKPA appears midway through Pub.L. No. 96-611 (immediately preceding section 6 of the statute). The location of the short title in the body of an Act is usually as near to the beginning of the Act as possible. 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 20.11 (4th rev. ed. 1985) [hereinafter Sutherland ]. Therefore, the fact that the PKPA’s short title appears after section 2, the provision containing the effective date for Pub.L. No. 96-611, indicates that the PKPA was intended as a separate act not subject to the section 2 effective date.

The inapplicability of the July 1, 1981 effective date to the PKPA becomes clearer when the manner of the PKPA’s passage is considered. The PKPA, a bill contemplated by Congress for several years, was finally passed by the Senate when its chief sponsor, Senator Malcolm Wallop, on the floor of the Senate added the PKPA as a rider to a bill on pneumococcal vaccines. See 126 Cong.Rec. 33928-29 (1980). The July 1, 1981 effective date, referring to “services furnished,” was part of the vaccine bill, not part of the PKPA.

Finally, although by its terms Pub.L. No. 96-611 did not become effective until July 1, 1981, the statute was enacted on December 28, 1980. Section 10 of the Act (a part of the PKPA) requires the Attorney General to report to Congress 120 days after its *1551 enactment on the steps taken to comply with Congress’ expressed intent that 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982) (prohibiting flight to avoid prosecution) apply to cases involving parental kidnapping and interstate or international flight. This provision plainly contemplates an effective date of December 28, 1980 for the PKPA; were we to hold that the PKPA did not become effective until July 1, 1981, we would ignore the Congressional reporting requirement imposed upon the Attorney General. Where a statute may be given a reasonable interpretation consistent with its language and legislative purpose, we need not give it a literal application which would lead to absurd results. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 , 60 S.Ct. 337, 339 , 84 L.Ed. 340 (1940); 2A Sutherland, supra, § 54.06 (4th rev. ed. 1984). We conclude section 1738A became effective upon its enactment date, December 28, 1980, 3 and therefore applies to this case.

V

The real issue here is whether David’s complaint states a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The PKPA requires states to accord full faith and credit to another state’s child custody determination 4 made in compliance with the statute’s provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). The statute sets forth the conditions under which a state may assert jurisdiction to enter its own child custody determination resulting in a modification 5 of the determination of the court of another state. The operative provisions of the PKPA are set out in the margin. 6

*1552 David contends Congress intended to give parents a cause of action in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance by state courts with the standards established by section 1738A. Susan contends Congress intended to provide federal statutory standards binding upon state courts in affording full faith and credit to child custody decrees, but did not intend to create a cause of action in federal court for the enforcement of these standards.

To determine whether a particular cause of action exists under the statute, “our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action,” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 , 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485 , 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); and that we determine by looking to “the language of the statute itself,” id., and to the statute’s legislative history. Id. at 571-74 , 99 S.Ct. at 2486-88 .

From our examination of these materials we conclude the statute does not create a cause of action in federal court.

A.

The PKPA does not expressly authorize suit in federal court to enforce its provisions.

The language of the statute suggests no such cause of action was intended. The statute is directed at the states, and particularly state courts: “The appropriate authorities of every State shall ...;” “A court of a State may modify ...;” “A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction....” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (f), (g) (emphasis added). In this respect the language mirrors that of the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself and of section 1738, the statutory embodiment of the Clause.

Congress’ general purposes were also stated in terms of the state courts: “(1) promote cooperation between State courts ...;” and “(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts ....” Pub.L. 96-611, § 7 (c)(1) and (5), 94 Stat. at 3569 (emphasis added). Similarly, Congress provided: “In furtherance of the purposes of section 1738A ... State courts axe encouraged” to give priority to custody proceedings and to award costs and expenses against child snatchers. Pub.L. 96-611, § 8 (c), 94 Stat. at 3571 (emphasis added). The language of the statutory findings is particularly significant. Congress noted the growing number of child custody and visitation cases in the courts of the “States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories and possessions of the United States. ” Pub.L. 96-611, § 7 (a)(1), 94 Stat. at 3568 (emphasis added), reprinted in note following 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1985), and “the failure of the courts of such jurisdictions to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the other jurisdictions.” Id. at § 7(a)(4). “For those reasons,” Congress found,

Id. at § 7(b) (emphasis added). This language clearly states the duty of applying the statutory standards in determining jurisdiction is imposed upon the state courts themselves.

In contrast, nowhere in the statute is it stated or implied that the obligations imposed by section 1738A are to be imposed upon federal courts or are to be enforced by federal courts.

B.

We turn to the background and legislative history of PKPA, which, as will be seen, supports the contention that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action in federal court for the enforcement of section 1738A.

The PKPA was adopted primarily to reduce the incentive for parental child-snatching created by refusal of a significant number of states to give effect to the child custody decrees of other states. Prior to enactment of the PKPA, a parent who lost a custody battle in one state had every incentive to snatch the child and move to another state to relitigate the custody issue. Often the snatcher would be rewarded with a favorable custody decree notwithstanding the existence of a conflicting custody decree from the original state. 7

Such forum shopping was possible because states were not bound by the child custody decrees of sister states. It was not clear that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied to custody determinations, see Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192 , 83 S.Ct. 273, 276 , 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), and even if it did, a state was bound by the prior custody decree of another state only to the extent that the courts of the state entering the decree would be bound, id. at 194 , 83 S.Ct. at 277 . Because the state entering the decree might modify it freely as conditions affecting the child changed, the courts of another state were free to modify a child custody decree in the same way. Id. at 191 n. 2, 83 S.Ct. at 275 n. 2. 8

*1554 In an attempt to deal with the problem, a number of states enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. §§ 1-28 (1979), which established standards for selecting the appropriate state forum to determine custody, and imposed a duty on the enacting states to recognize and enforce its custody decree entered by such a state forum. The UCCJA proved unsatisfactory for several reasons. A substantial number of states did not adopt the UCCJA, and thus continued to provide havens for child snatchers. See PKPA Hearing, supra, at 144 (statement of Prof. Coombs). Several states enacted variations on UCCJA undermining the uniformity essential to the elimination of forum-shopping. Id. Even among states that enacted identical provisions, variations in interpretation and application created a potential for dual exercise of jurisdiction and conflicting custody awards. Id. at 144-45. In adopting the PKPA, Congress sought to solve these problems by imposing upon all states a single uniform set of federal standards identical to those found in the UCCJA.

Several aspects of the PKPA's legislative history negate the conclusion that Congress intended to create a federal cause of action to enforce its terms, any more than the UCCJA itself created such a forum.

C.

Committee hearings and floor debates, like the statute itself, reflect a uniform characterization of the section 1738A proposal as addressed to the states and imposing a new obligation upon state courts. 9

In striking contrast, there is only one mention in the legislative materials of any role for the federal courts in the enforcement of PKPA. 10 That single reference, discussed in part II E below, occurred during the colloquy leading to the rejection of proposals by Congressman Fish to grant federal courts jurisdiction to enforce custody decrees. As will be seen, it strongly suggests section 1738A should not be read as providing a cause of action in federal court.

D.

As noted, the problem identified by Congress was not the absence of a federal cause of action, but lack of uniform standards governing assertion of jurisdiction over child custody matters by state courts. In both committee hearings and floor debates, ineffectiveness of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in child custody proceedings was repeatedly identified as the crux of the problem. 11 Congress’ response was to provide in section 1738A that child custody decrees must be accorded full faith and credit under the uniform standards provid *1555 ed by Congress, thus requiring states to honor the decrees of other states pursuant to a uniform set of federal rules. 12

Congressional leaders pointed to the UCCJA as the model for section 1738A both in committee hearings and floor debate. Congress’ intention was simply to adopt the UCCJA as a federal procedure applicable to all of the states. This is unmistakably clear from the statements of Senator Wallop in introducing the bill that became section 1738A. 13

The significance of the fact that section 1738A is a deliberate copy of the UCCJA is that Congress was well aware that the UCCJA imposed standards only upon state courts and was enforceable only in such courts. 14 The obvious inference is that Congress intended the duty imposed by section 1738A also to fall only upon the state courts and to be enforceable only in those courts, and not in federal courts.

The Supreme Court held long ago that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not a source of federal jurisdiction.

Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 , 24 S.Ct. 598, 605 , 48 L.Ed. 870 (1904); see also C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 13B Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 3563, at 50 (1984). With a single exception noted in the margin, 15 no court *1556 has held the Full Faith and Credit Clause or its implementing statute, section 1738, authorized private suit in federal district court to require a state court to give full faith and credit to the judgment of a court of another state. It seems highly unlikely Congress would follow the pattern of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and section 1738 by structuring section 1738A as a command to state courts to give full faith and credit to the child custody decrees of other states, and yet, without comment, depart from the enforcement practice followed under the Clause and section 1738. The reasonable assumption is that Congress intended the new statute to be implemented as the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its statutory manifestation, section 1738, have been implemented for two centuries.

E.

While Congress was deliberating the PKPA’s full faith and credit approach, proposals to create a federal cause of action to resolve interstate child custody disputes were submitted to Congress and rejected.

This is reflected in a letter addressed during Congressional consideration of PKPA to Representative Peter M. Rodino, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House, by then Assistant Attorney General, now Circuit Judge, Patricia M. Wald, on behalf of the Department of Justice. The Wald letter, extensively quoted in the margin, 16 is the source material re *1557 ferred to most frequently in the legislative proceedings. It touches upon most of the factors relevant to a proper interpretation of PKPA. The Department’s letter divides legislative proposals pending in the Congress into three groups: (1) those that would make “child snatching” a crime; (2) those that “would amend title 28 of the Code to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts to enforce state custody decrees;” and (3) section 1738A, which “would impose on states a federal duty, under enumerated standards derived generally from the UCCJA, to give full faith and credit to the custody decrees of other states.” (Emphasis added.) The Department of Justice opposed proposals in the second category in part because they “would increase the workload of the federal courts;” the Department endorsed section 1738A in part because it would not pose the same problems. See also H.R. 1290 Hearing, supra, at 139-40 (statement of Prof. Coombs). Congress acted in accordance with the Department’s recommendations. Thus the choice now urged upon us has been presented to the Congress and resolved.

This is reflected also in proceedings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. Representative Fish testified in support of bills he had introduced, H.R. 9913 and H.R. 11273, which conferred jurisdiction upon federal district courts over private suits to enforce custody decrees when children subject to the decrees were removed to other states. 17 Representative Conyers, Chairman of the Subcommittee, questioned Congressman Fish regarding the difference between these bills and the bill that became section 1738A, referred to in the colloquy as the “Bennett proposal”: 18

H.R. 1290 Hearing, supra, at 14. Following this exchange the House Subcommittee approved the Bennett proposal, now section 1738A, and rejected the Fish proposals providing for enforcement in a federal forum.

VI

Finally, the PKPA must be interpreted in light of the strong policies reflected in the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, resting on the principle that “[T]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the laws of the United States.” Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 , 50 S.Ct. 154, 155 , 74 L.Ed. 489 (1930) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 , 10 S.Ct. 850, 852-53 , 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890)).

In keeping with this principle, “federal courts must decline jurisdiction of cases concerning domestic relations when the primary issue concerns the status of parent and child or husband and wife.” Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1968); see also Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir.1982). Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters. See, e.g., Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); Bergstrom, v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517, 520 (8th Cir.1980); Huynh Thi Ahn v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632-34 (6th Cir.1978); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir.1967).

Appellant recognizes the weight of the policy considerations behind the domestic relations exception, and concedes that in adopting section 1738A Congress did not wish to involve federal courts in custody disputes. Appellant suggests, however, that this Congressional intention may be honored by limiting the federal cause of action under the PKPA to resolution of the jurisdictional facts — that is, determining which state court had jurisdiction under the statutory standard — leaving to the courts of that state the resolution of the merits of the custody dispute. The difficulty is not so easily avoided.

The PKPA is so structured that in a type of case likely to arise frequently, a federal court deciding which of two conflicting state court decrees is valid under the PKPA could not avoid becoming involved in the merits of the underlying dispute. Under section 1738A(c)(2)(C)(i), a state may have jurisdiction if “the child has been abandoned,” and under section 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii), a state may assert jurisdiction because “it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” In this very case Susan’s petition to the Louisiana court al *1559 leges mistreatment and abuse of Matthew by his father. Whether or not subsections (f) and (g) would obviate the need to determine the truth of the allegations in this case, 19 it is incontestible that in any case in which the first state assumed jurisdiction under section 1738A(c)(2)(C) the federal court would be compelled to resolve the question of abandonment or mistreatment, a question that in all probability would also be highly relevant if not determinative in the resolution of the merits of the custody dispute. Absent a clear command from Congress, the longstanding prohibition against federal court involvement in such matters should not be disregarded.

VII

For these reasons we conclude the PKPA creates no cause of action enforceable in federal court, and appellant did not and could not state a cause of action under section 1738A in the court below.

The District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits, in dicta, have expressed the same view. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1982). The Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held to the contrary. See McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.1986); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1985); DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir.1984); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.1984).

The Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits did not find direct support for their construction in the language or legislative history of the statute. Each rested its decision upon the conclusion that without a federal forum to enforce the restrictions imposed by the statute upon state courts those restrictions would be rendered “nugatory” and Congress’ purpose would be “thwarted.” See McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1477 ; Heartfield, 749 F.2d at 1141 ; Flood, 727 F.2d at 312 .

We are not persuaded and, more to the point, there is no evidence that Congress was persuaded, that the states would disregard the solemn mandate of Congress so clearly expressed in section 1738A. As we have seen, the consideration found by these Circuits to be dispositive is nowhere reflected in the language of the statute or its legislative history. If members of Congress considered the possibility at all they may well have concluded that if such incidents occurred they would be rare and could be corrected by Supreme Court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) without a substantial drain upon the Court’s limited resources.

AFFIRMED.

. Because the full state court record was not made a part of our record, it is unclear who initiated the 1980 proceedings or what the precise issue at those proceedings was. David alleges he filed a petition requesting sole custody. Susan asserts she filed a motion to obtain the court’s permission to move to Louisiana with Matthew.

. David maintains the award of sole custody to Susan was temporary pending conclusion of the court-ordered investigation, and concludes the California proceeding was still pending when Susan moved to Louisiana. Susan construes the award as permanent, apparently assuming the investigation was undertaken solely with regard to David's visitation rights.

. Our conclusion is consistent with those of a number of state courts which have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 281 S.C. 316 , 315 S.E.2d 158 , 160 n. 4 (1984); Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tenn. App.1983); Belosky v. Belosky, 97 N.M. 365 , 640 P.2d 471, 472 (1982); State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M. 327 , 639 P.2d 1181, 1183 (1981); In re Custody of Ross, 291 Or. 263 , 630 P.2d 353 , 362 n. 20 (1981). But cf. Kumar v. County Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 689 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 652 P.2d 1003 (1982) (PKPA became effective on July 1, 1981, but may be retroactive); In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal.App.3d 443 , 460 n. 10, 175 Cal.Rptr. 903 (1981) (PKPA became effective on July 1, 1981, and does, not have retroactive , application).

. Section 1738A(b)(3) defines a child custody determination as "a judgment, decree or other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child, ... including] permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications."

. A modification is "a custody determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or not.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(5).

. Subsections (cMg) of section 1738A read:

(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if—

which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement *1552 of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.

(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pend-ency of a proceeding in another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination.

. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Sen. Comm, on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Sen. Comm, on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980) [hereinafter PKPA Hearing ] (statement of Paul Michel, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice); see also Parental Kidnaping, 1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Comm, on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1979) [hereinafter PK Hearing ] (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop).

. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979: Addendum to Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm, on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1980) [hereinafter PKPA Addendum ] (letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to Rep. Peter Rodino):

See also PK Hearing, supra, at 166 (statement of Sen. Wallop); PKPA Hearing, supra, at 48 (Statement of Paul Michel):

See also id. at 12-13 (statement of Sen. Wallop); id. at 40-42 (statement of Sen. Durenberger); id. at 96-97 (statement of Donald E. Clevenger, Fathers United for Equal Rights and the U.S. Divorce Reform); id. at 144-45 (statement of Russell M. Coombs, Professor of Law at Rutgers University).

. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 96-1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 41; 126 Cong.Rec. 22806-08 (1980) (statement of Sen. Wallop); 125 Cong.Rec. 758 (1979) (statement of Sen. McGovern); id. at 738-39 (statement of Sen. Wallop); 124 Cong.Rec. 787 (1978) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); PKPA Hearing, supra, at 18 (statement of Rep. Bennett); id. at 15 (statement of Sen. Wallop); PKPA Addendum, supra, at 138-40 (submission of Sen. Wallop).

. This is true although federal involvement in implementing the statute is commented upon on a number of occasions, see, e.g., 125 Cong.Rec. 758 (1978) (statement of Sen. McGovern); PKPA Hearing at 20 (statement of Rep. Duncan); and the anticipated course of proceedings under section 1738A was described many times. See, e.g., 126 Cong.Rec. 22806 (1980) (statement of Sen. Wallop); Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, pt. 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1004-05 (statement of Prof. Coombs) [hereinafter Criminal Law Hearing]; PKPA Hearing, supra, at 8 (statement of Sen. Wallop); PKPA Addendum, supra, at 139-40 (submission of Sen. Wallop); PKPA Hearing, supra, at 18 (statement of Rep. Bennett); id. at 40-41 (statement of Sen. Durenberger).

. See e.g., 126 Cong.Rec. 22817 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston); id. at 22818 (statement of Sen. Durenberger); 125 Cong.Rec. 758 (1979) (statement of Sen. McGovern); 124 Cong.Rec. 5726 (1978) (statement of Rep. Moss); PKPA Hearing, supra, at 40 (statement of Sen. Durenberger); id. at 18 (statement of Rep. Bennett); id. at 15-16 (statement of Sen. Wallop); PKPA Addendum, supra, at 138-40 (submission of Sen. Wallop); Parental Kidnaping: Hearing on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980) (statement of Rep. Fish) [hereinafter H.R. 1290 Hearing].

. See PKPA Addendum, supra, at 138 (submission of Sen. Wallop); PKPA Hearing, supra, at 15 (statement of Sen. Wallop); id. at 48 (statement of Mr. Michel); PK Hearing, supra, at 50 (statement of Prof. Bodenheimer).

. Senator Wallop said:

125 Cong.Rec. 739 (1979).

When Senator Wallop later offered section 1738A as an amendment to the proposed Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act, H.R. 2977, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 1843, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), he again said:

(See exhibit 2.)

126 Cong.Rec. 22807 (1980) (statement of Sen. Wallop).

After discussing the UCCJA and its relationship with proposed section 1738A, Senator Wallop continued:

125 Cong.Rec. 22807-08 (1980) (statement of Sen. Wallop).

. See PKPA Hearing, supra, at 8, 15, 22 (statement of Sen. Wallop); id. at 18 (statement of Rep. Bennett); id. at 40 (statement of Sen. Durenberger); PKPA Addendum, supra, at 138-40 (submission of Sen. Wallop); PK Hearing, supra, at 167 (statement of Sen. Wallop); 126 Cong.Rec. 22817 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston); id. at 22818 (statement of Sen. Durenberger); 124 Cong.Rec. 787 (1978) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). See also paragraph 3 of Wald letter, infra, n. 16.

. The Third Circuit expressed a contrary view in Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984), that "a federal court may decide whether a state judgment involving domestic relations is *1556 enforceable.” However, none of the eight Supreme Court cases cited holds that a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or section 1738 provides the basis for a cause of action in federal court. Seven of the cited cases were Supreme Court decisions reviewing decisions of state courts, not federal courts. If a state court refuses to honor the decision of a court of another state, review may ultimately be sought in the Supreme Court since a federal question is raised: the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or of section 1738; but none of the eight cases, nor any other case, suggests that instead of following this route, a litigant may file suit in a federal district court under section 1738 and obtain a determination that failure of a state court to enforce the decree of a court of another state violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause or section 1738. The eighth case cited in Flood was a diversity case. Thus all eight decisions involved state law causes of action.

. This document, reprinted in PKPA Addendum at 101, reads in part as follows:

H.R. 988 also adopts a full faith and credit approach. We prefer the provisions of S. 1437.

. H.R. 9913, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) reads, in part:

H.R. 11273, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), introduced by Rep. Fish in the second session of the 95th Congress, was' an exact copy of H.R. 9913. H.R. 11722, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), introduced by Rep. Dornan, was substantially identical.

. Rep. Bennett’s proposal, H.R. 1290, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), is practically identical to the enacted § 1738A, except that H.R. 1290 would also have created a federal criminal penalty for “child snatching."

. Subsections (f) and (g) might be read to mean that so long as the first state had and retains jurisdiction, no other state may modify the first state’s decree or enter a decree of its own, even though the child has been abandoned in the second state or there is an emergency involving actual or threatened abuse of the child. Another interpretation is that the second state is permitted to act in the limited situations in subsection (c) despite initial and continuing jurisdiction in the first state.