Stewart stands convicted of six counts of distribution, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and LSD. His conviction was affirmed by this court. United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825 (9th Cir.1985) (Stewart I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 888 , 88 L.Ed.2d 922 (1986). We did, however, remand for resentencing in order to correct what we found to be errors in the sentencing process. Following remand, he was resentenced to the sentence originally imposed, and his present appeal is from that sentence.

In his original sentencing hearing and on appeal in Stewart I, Stewart had challenged much of the information contained in his presentence report. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) provides that a sentencing court faced with such a challenge “shall, as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing.” Following United States v. Ibarra, 737 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir.1984), we ruled that the district court had failed to comply with the rule and remanded for resentencing in order to allow the district court to comply.

The challenged information related to activities of Stewart in Canada. Following its resentencing hearing, the court made the following finding:

This constitutes compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(D).

Stewart had been tried with a co-defendant North, who had received sentences totaling three and one-half years. For the crimes for which both he and North were convicted, Stewart has received sentences totaling fifteen years. (He has also received an additional consecutive sentence of ten years for possession of 25.37 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute, a crime for which North was not indicted. Thus, Stewart’s total sentence is twenty-five years.)

In Stewart I this court noted the disparity in sentencing. We stated: “[W]ithout an explanation it is difficult to assess the reasons for the marked disparity.... An explanation on the record would be helpful to the reviewing court and adequate reasons would dispel the appearance of unfairness.” 770 F.2d at 833 .

The district court has now made findings to justify the disparity. Following the hearing on resentencing, it stated:

Stewart attacks these findings, asserting that the reference to the likelihood that he manufactured the LSD is wholly speculative. In our judgment, there was enough evidence in the record to support the inference drawn by the district court. The district court may rely on such inferences in sentencing. United States v. Hull, 792 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Robelo, 596 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1979). The fact that the court relied only on evidence in the trial record distinguishes this case from that of United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 , 92 S.Ct. 748 , 30 L.Ed.2d 749 (1972). The court’s statement of reasons provides an explanation for the disparity such that it cannot be said that in imposing the sentence the court acted arbitrarily.

In all respects, the sentence imposed upon Stewart is AFFIRMED.