facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), (2). If the state court erred in this manner, we consider the

constitutional claim de novo. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008)

(en banc).

The district court did not err in rejecting this claim. The district court

properly held that the Nevada Supreme Court’s finding that the views of Juror

#157 would not “prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as

a juror” may have been unreasonable in light of the record evidence. Juror #157

repeatedly and unequivocally stated that she would not consider imposing a

sentence of life with parole for someone convicted of first degree murder, except in

3 one narrow circumstance not applicable to Walker’s case, such that she should

have been excused for cause. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).

Further, the district court properly concluded that, even if the trial court

incorrectly refused to excuse Juror #157 for cause, Walker was “subsequently

convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, [such that] he has not been

deprived of any . . . constitutional right.” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528

U.S. 304, 307 (2000); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 157 (2009) (“If a

defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not

challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court’s

good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern.”). We affirm the

district court’s denial of this claim.

3. We decline Walker’s request to expand the certificate of appealability to

include his claim relating to the State’s use of peremptory strikes against potential

female jurors.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

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