discussion on the merits on any of the evidentiary objections.” See Sica v. United

States, 325 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1963) (“The trial court is not required to explain

each of its rulings to counsel.”). And any error was harmless. API argued to the

bankruptcy court that, contrary to Tavera’s sworn statement, he “did not

commence representing Defendants in the State Case until several years after

October 2005.” But Tavera’s declaration concerns events that occurred when API

acknowledges that he represented the state court defendants, and the attached

documents from before that period could have been obtained, as Tavera asserted,

“from the court dockets.” Forsley’s declaration, which analyzed API’s counsel’s

billing records from 2005 to 2010, did not impact the bankruptcy court’s analysis

given the court’s finding that API was not entitled to additional fees.2

4. The bankruptcy court did not violate the time limits set forth in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(d)

when it allowed Davis to file various documents in support of the trustee’s

objection to API’s proofs of claim. Nor did the court deny API due process. API

had several opportunities to respond to Davis’s submissions, and API does not

explain how any lack of opportunity caused it prejudice—a prerequisite for relief.

See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 808 (9th Cir. 2002).

2 We affirm that finding in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

4

AFFIRMED.

5