facts in the SAC showing that either defendant acted with deliberate indifference.

See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 766, 785-86.

5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims in the

SAC without leave to amend because Martinez failed to cure the complaint’s

deficiencies despite the district court’s specific instructions about how to do so. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (standard of review;

leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies in the complaint cannot be

cured by amendment); see also Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F.,

792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave

to amend is particularly broad where the court has already given the plaintiff an

opportunity to amend his complaint.”).

6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s untimely

discovery requests. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th

Cir. 2003) (district court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery, and a

3 ruling denying discovery will not be disturbed absent the clearest showing of

actual and substantial prejudice).

7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s request

for appointment of counsel because Martinez failed to demonstrate exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard

of review; explaining the “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

AFFIRMED.

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