DISCUSSION

Defendant argues his prior prison term enhancements must be stricken based on the retroactive application of Senate Bill 136. The People agree, as do we. Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 136 amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit application of prior prison term enhancements to only prior prison terms that were served for sexually violent offenses as defined by Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) That amendment applies retroactively to all cases not yet final on Senate Bill 136’s effective date. (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341–342, citing In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 742.) Here, the trial court imposed two one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements based on defendant’s convictions for burglary and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, neither of which is a violent sexual offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). On January 1, 2020, defendant’s case was not yet final. Therefore, as the parties agree, defendant is entitled to

3 The abstract of judgment reflects that the court struck the punishment for all enhancements, but the trial court was clear in its oral pronouncement that it imposed those enhancements when it sentenced defendant to an eight-year term. Indeed, if the court had struck the enhancements, defendant’s sentence would have been three years rather than eight years. The court’s oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the sentence reflected in the abstract of judgment. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)

3. the ameliorative benefit of Senate Bill 136’s amendment to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The People argue the matter should be remanded for the sentencing court to “reconsider all sentencing choices, particularly since the court did not impose the maximum sentence available.” Defendant does not respond. We agree with the People. Where an appellate court strikes a portion of a sentence, remand for “ ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is [generally] appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) However, when the trial court imposes the maximum possible sentence, remand after striking a portion of the sentence is unnecessary. (Id. at p. 896, fn. 15; People v. Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 342.) Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of three years plus enhancements for a total term of eight years. Under the terms of the plea agreement, it could have imposed a term of nine years. Because we strike part of the sentence and because the trial court did not impose the maximum term available, we remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We note that, on remand, the court may not impose a sentence that exceeds the term originally imposed—eight years. (People v. Mustafaa (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1310–1312; see People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764, overruled on other grounds in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1; People v. Torres (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1431–1433.)

DISPOSITION

The two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) are stricken. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court may not impose a sentence that exceeds eight years. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the appropriate entities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

4.