facts.”

After the district court ruled against him on these two alternative grounds,

3 Davis sought and was granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from the district

court certifying issues for appeal: that (1) “Petitioner’s 60(b) Motion was untimely

and did not present extraordinary circumstances warranting review;” and (2)

“regardless of timeliness, Petitioner’s claims did not excuse his procedural default.”

Notwithstanding the breadth of the district court’s certified issues—which

were broad enough that the COA essentially covered the entirety of the district

court’s decision—Davis on appeal to this court filed an opening brief that did not

squarely address either the certified issues or the district court’s lengthy decision.

Instead, the opening brief contains a long overview of applicable law, a detailed

procedural history, and an argument section filled with conclusory and general

statements that fail to address any specific conclusions from the district court.

Davis’s brief states, for example, that he “was not accorded appellate review,” “[t]he

state courts’ disposition of Davis’[s] claims on collateral review was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of federal law,” “state procedures were not adequate to

vindicate constitutional rights,” and “[t]he appellate court’s accounting of the

evidence it deemed sufficient to sustain the conviction is patently insufficient to

establish the elements of premeditated murder ….” But nowhere does Davis’s

opening brief directly and specifically address any of the district court’s grounds for

its long and detailed decision. For example, the opening brief never mentions the

district court’s conclusion that Davis misled the district court about pursuing relief

4 post-Martinez. This was the central reason that the district court reversed its decision

that the Rule 60(b) motion was timely. Nor does Davis address the reasons the

district court gave for rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

precluding his new claims, or rejecting the claims Davis previously raised in the state

court.

In response to Davis’s opening brief, the State gave notice pursuant to Ninth

Circuit Rule 22–1(f) that no answering brief would be filed because Davis failed to

brief any of the certified issues.2 The State is correct. Davis did not address the

certified issues, and therefore waived them. See Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039,

1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We ‘will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are

not specifically and distinctly argued in appellant’s opening brief.’” (emphasis

added; alteration and citation omitted)).3

AFFIRMED.

2 The State explained it would file a brief responding to the opening brief if ordered by the court. 3 Davis’s Motion for Submission of Rule 60(b) Appeal for Decision, ECF No. 24, is denied as moot. The State’s Motion for Clarification, ECF No. 28, is also denied as moot.

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