Delmus Punton, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. The City of Seattle, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee

The City of Seattle appeals from a district court judgment for money damages, assigning error to the denial of its motion to dismiss Punton’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on the basis of the res judicata effect of a prior state court judgment. Punton v. City of Seattle Public Safety Commission, 32 Wash.App. 959 , 650 P.2d 1138 (1982), cert. denied, 98 Wash.2d 1014 (1983). Punton cross-appeals, challenging the district court’s refusal to grant him the full amount of attorneys’ fees requested pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 .

In September 1980, Punton, an officer of the Seattle Police Department, was dismissed from his job for conduct unbecoming an officer, disobedience of a superior’s order, allowing unauthorized persons to ride in his patrol car and other infractions of department rules. Punton was not advised of the charges against him or afforded a hearing at any time prior to receiving his notice of dismissal.

Shortly after his dismissal, Punton filed an appeal with the Seattle Public Safety Civil Service Commission. He argued that the department’s failure to provide a pre-termination hearing rendered his discharge constitutionally invalid. The commission did not reach the…

(dissenting):

The question presented by the City’s appeal concerns the preclusive effect of a final Washington state court judgment reinstating Delmus Punton as a Seattle police officer and awarding him back pay because the Seattle Police Department denied Pun-ton due process by firing him without a pretermination hearing. Punton v. City of Seattle Public Safety Commission, 32 Wash.App. 959 , 650 P.2d 1138 (1982), cert. denied, 98 Wash.2d 1014 (1983). More specifically, the question is whether the Washington state court judgment precludes Pun-ton from bringing a separate § 1983 action to recover his damages for pain and suffering and his attorney’s fees.

For reasons that are obscure, the majority disposes of this appeal on the ground that the City did not deny Punton due process. Thus the majority decides the merits of Punton’s constitutional claim without determining the preclusive effect of the contrary state court judgment. 1 I find this peculiar for several reasons: First, concerns for judicial economy and restraint counsel us to address threshold preclusion issues before reaching the merits of a claim, especially a constitutional one. Second, the City has not appealed the…

805 F.2d 1378 Delmus PUNTON, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Nos. 83-3890, 83-4132. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted March 8, 1984. Submission Vacated Jan. 17, 1985. Resubmitted May 5, 1986. Decided Dec. 9, 1986. Lawrence B. Linville, Keller, Rohrback, Waldo, Hiscock, Butterworth & Fardal, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant. Susan Rae Sampson, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Before WRIGHT, GOODWIN and NORRIS, Circuit Judges. GOODWIN, Circuit Judge: 1 The City of Seattle appeals from a district court judgment for money damages, assigning error to the denial of its motion to dismiss Punton's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim on the basis of the res judicata effect of a prior state court judgment. Punton v. City of Seattle Public Safety Commission, 32 Wash.App. 959 , 650 P.2d 1138 (1982), cert. denied, 98 Wash.2d 1014 (1983). Punton cross-appeals, challenging the district court's refusal to grant him the full amount of attorneys' fees requested…