DISCUSSION

Djissa argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620, which authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the personal use enhancement imposed under section 12022.5. He seeks an order that the trial court apply this amendment and resentence him. Senate Bill No. 620 amended section 12022.5 to authorize a trial court to strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement “at the time of sentencing.” (§ 12022.5, subd. (c).) The amendment was effective as of January 1, 2018, well before Djissa entered his plea and was sentenced in July 2019. (People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50, 54.) Djissa does not cite a legal basis for the trial court to consider the application of the amendment in post- conviction proceedings. His reliance on Hurlic is misplaced, as the facts and circumstances of that case have no application here. (See id. at p. 53 [considering appeal by the defendant who pleaded no contest prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620].) Moreover, his no contest plea forecloses review of his sentence on the grounds he raises here. (See § 1237.5, subd. (a) [following entry of a plea of guilty or no contest, no appeal shall be taken unless the defendant shows “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings”]; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094 [a defendant generally may not take an appeal following entry of a

3 plea of guilty or no contest “except on grounds going to the legality of the proceedings, including the validity of his plea”].) There are no facts in the record to suggest that the trial court or counsel concluded that the amendment to section 12022.5 was not applicable to Djissa’s case, or that Djissa was so advised. We also note that to the extent that Djissa’s request for relief can be construed as a motion to recall the sentence, a trial court may recall a sentence on its own motion within 120 days of sentencing. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1).) Section 1170, subdivision (d), does not authorize a defendant to initiate a sentence recall proceeding in the trial court. (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1165.) Thus, Djissa’s motion before the trial court was both untimely and procedurally improper. We are satisfied that Djissa’s counsel has fulfilled his responsibilities (see People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1038-1039, review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264278), and conclude that the appeal raises no arguable issues.

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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s April 20, 2020, order denying Djissa’s motion to recall his sentence under section 1170, subdivision (d) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

FEDERMAN, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

*Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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