DISCUSSION

It is well-settled that “‘“[a]n appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. [Citations.]”’” (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623.) “If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot. [Citation.] However, ‘there are three discretionary exceptions to the rules regarding mootness: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Environmental

3 Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) Applying these legal principles, we conclude that 1 appellant’s appeal is moot. The only issue in this appeal is the propriety of the restraining order issued for the benefit of respondent and against appellant. Although the restraining order may have been for five years, respondent, the protected person, has passed away. It goes without saying that the restraining order is no longer in effect. It is moot, and therefore so is this appeal. Moreover, none of the exceptions set forth above applies. First, this is not a case of broad public interest; it was a private, family matter. Second, there is no chance of recurrence because respondent passed away. Third, the issuance of the restraining order is the only question presented in this appeal; there are no outstanding material questions for either this court or the trial court to address. It follows that there are no consequences for appellant “in this and future court proceedings.” (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209.)

1 Even assuming this appeal was not moot, we briefly note that appellant has not met her burden in demonstrating that the trial court’s order is not supported by substantial evidence. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137.) Respondent’s son’s testimony supports the issuance of the restraining order. To the extent appellant contends that we should defer to her contradictory evidence, it is well-settled that the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 958.)

4 Trying to squeeze the instant appeal into the third identified exception, appellant contends that the issuance of the restraining order has consequences for a future lawsuit that she intends to file against the nursing home. According to appellant, the nursing home “fraudulently and maliciously instigated” appellant’s brother into filing the petition for a restraining order on respondent’s behalf. Because the question of whether there was any merit to the nursing home’s concerns will be at issue in her anticipated lawsuit against the nursing home, and whether the nursing home committed fraud, appellant claims that we must reach the merits of the instant appeal. Appellant seems to be making some sort of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel argument. But, the problem for appellant is that she does not adequately explain or flesh out this purported argument, let alone even mention these legal principles. We decline to consider the issues raised in appellant’s briefs that are not properly presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable, and we treat them as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19; In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1661; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545–546; see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellant bears the burden of supporting a point with reasoned argument]; County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591 [appellant must present argument on each point made].) Appellant’s election to act as her own attorney on appeal does not entitle her to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th

5 1276, 1284; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246– 1247.) In her letter brief, appellant further argues that the appeal is not moot because it “will continue to exist until its expiration date, unless a party, through a motion to modify or terminate the order of protection, petitions the trial court for its termination on the basis that the death of the protected party makes the restraining order moot.” We cannot agree. Appellant directs us to no legal authority to support her novel proposition that when a person protected by a restraining order passes away, someone must move to vacate the restraining order or it will continue until its expiration. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; County of Sacramento v. Lackner, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 591.) Appellant also argues that the appeal is not moot because the issuance of the restraining order damages her reputation “as it shows up in criminal and civil restraining order background checks by potential employers and apartment landlords, as well as other potentially interested entities or persons.” In other words, appellant wants to “clear her reputation.” However, appellant neglects to offer any legal authority to support her claim that we can reach the merits of this civil appeal in order to clear her reputation. (See People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486–490 [clearing one’s name can serve as an exception permitting review of a moot appeal in the criminal context].) Finally, appellant offers no evidence to support her contention that the issuance of this restraining order has prejudiced or will prejudice her. Has she applied for a job and been declined because the potential employer learned of this

6 restraining order? Has she tried to obtain an apartment lease and been declined for the same reason? Who are the other “potentially interested entities or persons”? Absent answers, supported by evidence, to these questions, appellant has not overcome her burden in demonstrating that this appeal is not moot. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [appellate court is not required to make an independent, unassisted search of the appellate record]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406–407 [appellate court can deem a contention unsupported by a record citation to be without foundation and thus forfeited].) As set forth above, we decline to consider issues raised in appellant’s briefs that are not properly presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable, and we treat them as waived.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.

LUI

________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

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