facts necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. 2 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2020). Specifically, the BIA concluded petitioner’s proposed

social group of “young women who are abused by their fathers in El Salvador and

who are unable to flee because they are also targeted by the criminal gangs in El

Salvador” was “not cognizable because it is defined with reference to the

persecution itself.” But “the mere mention of harm does not categorically

disqualify an otherwise cognizable social group.” Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1085.

Rather, the BIA must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the

group is “defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to

harm.” Id. at 1086 (emphasis added) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.

Dec. 227, 242 (BIA 2014)). Because the BIA failed to conduct the required case-

by-case analysis here, we remand petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims to

the BIA for further consideration of in light of Diaz-Reynoso.2

2. The BIA applied the incorrect legal standard when it concluded petitioner

was not entitled to protection under CAT. The BIA reasoned “[petitioner] ha[d]

not shown that anyone in the El Salvadoran government would affirmatively

consent or acquiesce to her torture” (emphasis added). This is an incorrect

statement of the standard applicable to CAT claims. It is well established that the

2 Though the BIA invoked Matter of A-B- in its decision, petitioner’s brief urges us to remand to the BIA for consideration of that case. At this point, the intervening authority that requires reconsideration is Diaz-Reynoso. 3 government’s tacit consent or acquiescence to torture is sufficient to entitle an

applicant to CAT relief. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“The correct inquiry . . . is whether a respondent can show that public officials

demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to the torture of their citizens by third parties, or as

stated by the Fifth Circuit, whether public officials ‘would turn a blind eye to

torture.’” (citation omitted)). Because “affirmatively consent or acquiesce”

connotes a higher degree of culpability than mere “acquiescence,” “awareness,”

“willful blindness,” and “willful acceptance,” the BIA applied a higher legal

standard to deny petitioner’s claim for CAT relief. See Ornelas-Chavez v.

Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we remand to the

BIA to reconsider petitioner’s claim for CAT relief under the appropriate standard.

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.

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