discussion with Sergeant Nebel before he assessed the scene, in a manner made

possible only because of her status as a law enforcement officer. The jury could

also have concluded that there was no probable cause that Holmes had committed a

crime, because the officers on the scene who first investigated the incident and

interviewed the witnesses reached that conclusion. Although Sergeant Nebel

advised the officers to arrest Holmes, the jury could have concluded that Sergeant

Nebel had no additional factual basis for reaching that conclusion.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order a new

trial based on a line of questions that Holmes’s counsel asked Harris concerning

indemnification of attorneys’ fees. The court sustained Harris’s objections to those

questions, and Harris did not answer them. The unanswered questions do not

constitute prejudicial misconduct justifying a new trial on damages. Cooper v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991). Nor was any

3 other evidence or information regarding indemnification presented to the jury. Cf.

In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 2000).

Finally, we affirm the award of punitive damages. The punitive-damages

award was not unconstitutionally excessive, because it is undisputed on appeal that

Harris’s conduct was reprehensible, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages

(less than 2 to 1) is well within a constitutionally permissible limit, neither party

cites comparable cases, and Harris’s ability to pay is a neutral factor because it is

unknown whether the County will indemnify her. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.

Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–84 (1996); see also Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles,

891 F.3d 776, 806 (9th Cir. 2018).1

AFFIRMED.

1 Holmes’s motion to dismiss or summarily affirm, Dkt. No. 30, is denied. 4