facts necessary to decide the petition. 2 petitioner testify about matters central to his claim and thus prevented counsel from

presenting a full case).

Here, Petitioner was reasonably able to present her case. Counsel conducted

a direct examination, redirect examination, presented closing argument, and

entered all the evidence he sought to admit despite the IJ’s interruptions. The IJ’s

criticism did not force counsel to end his direct examination; counsel determined

that he did not “have anything further” after the IJ invited him to continue. The

IJ’s comments reflect confusion and frustration with counsel’s presentation as

opposed to prejudgment of the case. Finally, the IJ’s demeanor does not rise to the

level of denying petitioner a fair hearing. See Rizo v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 693

(9th Cir. 2016) (“While the record indicates that the IJ conducted Rizo’s removal

hearing in an aggressive manner, the IJ did not deny him a fair hearing”).

Moreover, Petitioner has not established prejudice. Petitioner does not point

to any testimony or evidence that she was prohibited from introducing, nor

describe how any omitted evidence would have changed the outcome. Compare

Zolotukhin, 417 F.3d at 1075–76 (prejudice established where the IJ excluded

testimony of key witnesses) with Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir.

2012) (observing petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice when he did not

explain how the IJ’s decision would be affected). Here, the IJ evaluated all the

3 evidence from the hearing in the written decision. See Sanchez-Cruz v. INS., 255

F.3d 775, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding prejudicial violation where the IJ’s

decision improperly “focused almost exclusively” on one aspect of petitioner’s

case, reflecting bias).

PETITION DENIED.

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