Petitioner Charles Bright seeks a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the restrictions on cross-examination of a prosecution witness deprived him of the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. We conclude that the restrictions were constitutionally permissible. We therefore affirm the conviction.

A Hawaii jury convicted Bright of murdering Zigmunt Zaborowski, generally known as Mike Todd. Bright admits he killed Todd, but maintains he did so in self-defense.

At trial, prosecution witness Carl Shank testified about a telephone conversation with Bright. In the state’s view, this testimony established that Bright pressured a witness to lie, indicating that he was aware of his guilt. The relevant portion of Shank’s testimony is as follows:

During cross-examination, Bright’s counsel offered an alternative explanation of the conversation: Bright merely urged Shank to tell the truth about Todd’s violent *228 disposition. Shank rejected this explanation. To support his characterization of the conversation, Bright’s counsel tried to ask Shank about particular criminal acts Todd had allegedly committed. The trial judge prevented him from doing so. 1

Bright claims that the trial judge improperly restricted his cross-examination of Shank. In reviewing his claim, we must determine whether the trial judge allowed “adequate” and “effective” cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 , 98 S.Ct. 1883 , 56 L.Ed.2d 392 (1978). More precisely, we must determine whether the jury, without the cross-examination Bright desired, “[was] otherwise in possession of sufficient information upon which to make a discriminating appraisal of the subject matter at issue.” Skinner, 564 F.2d at 1389 .

As a matter of state evidence law, the trial judge’s ruling was correct. Under Hawaii Rule of Evidence 405, cross-examination with regard to specific instances of conduct is permissible only if evidence of character or a trait of character is offered on direct examination. Haw.R.Evid. 405(a). Here, no such evidence was offered on direct. Shank testified about Bright’s entreaties on the eve of trial, not about Todd’s character. As the district court noted, “[t]he victim’s character was not an issue ... until [the defendant] brought it up on cross-examination.” Foreclosing cross-examination regarding specific instances of Todd’s conduct was, therefore, entirely proper.

Bright contends that Shank’s description of the telephone conversation constitutes character testimony. In support of this contention, he relies on a tortuous chain of inferences, proceeding roughly as follows: Bright urged Shank to describe Todd as a “bad person” but Shank refused; Shank therefore implied that Todd had good character; that implication constitutes character testimony. In our view, the chain is simply too attenuated to make inquiry into specific instances of conduct, with its attendant hazards, mandatory under the state’s rules of evidence.

Questioning Shank about Todd’s character would arguably have been permissible during Bright’s self-defense case. See *229 Haw.R.Evid. 405(b). However, Bright has never claimed that questioning Shank was part of his self-defense case. Instead, he has maintained that he attempted to introduce Todd’s character on cross-examination to rebut the inference that he urged Shank to lie, a collateral inquiry that could be properly foreclosed by the trial judge.

Evidentiary rulings valid under state law may still violate the Constitution. See e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Nonetheless, we strive to avoid the creation of a “vast and precise body of constitutional common law controlling the particulars of cross-examination” under the guise of the confrontation clause. Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.1980). Accordingly, we are reluctant to set aside a conviction when the defendant has enjoyed substantial cross-examination, particularly when the topic of cross-examination is a collateral matter. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292, 295 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (confrontation clause does not guarantee cross-examination effective in whatever way and to whatever extent defense wishes).

Bright’s counsel cross-examined Shank at length. He asked Shank whether Bright urged him to lie about Todd, and explored Shank’s understanding of the word "lie.” He asked Shank whether Todd was a bad person, and discussed Shank’s idea of a “bad person.” Throughout, he pressed Shank, albeit unsuccessfully, to adopt the defense’s interpretation of the conversation with Bright. In sum, while Bright’s counsel did not have the chance to take every possible tack with Shank, he did have the opportunity for substantial cross-examination. 2

When substantial cross-examination has taken place, courts are less inclined to find confrontation clause violations. In United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 258 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985), for example, the court affirmed a conviction despite the trial judge’s restriction of cross-examination concerning a witness’ unprosecuted crimes. The court held that cross-examination regarding the witness’ plea agreement provided the jury with sufficient information about the witness’ potential bias, and rejected the. confrontation clause challenge. Similarly, in Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.1982), the court affirmed a conviction despite the trial judge’s restriction of cross-examination concerning drug use by key witnesses. The court did not deny that the witnesses’ drug use was relevant, but decided that other evidence of it, already before the jury, satisfied the confrontation clause.

In addition to the amount of cross-examination permitted, another factor counseling affirmance is the collateral nature of the additional cross-examination Bright desired. That cross-examination did not concern Todd’s death, Bright’s state of mind, or Shank’s credibility. Instead, it involved Shank’s knowledge of Todd’s allegedly violent behavior, a subject that may fairly be described as tangential.

Under similar circumstances, the courts have turned away confrontation clause challenges. In United States v. Muelbl, 739 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 , 105 S.Ct. 388 , 83 L.Ed.2d 322 (1984), for example, the court affirmed a conviction in spite of the trial judge’s restriction of cross-examination concerning prior drug transactions. Noting that such transactions, though relevant, were outside the scope of the charged conspiracy, the court upheld the trial judge’s ruling. Similarly, in United States v. Kennedy, 714 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 , 104 S.Ct. 1305 , 79 L.Ed.2d 704 (1984), the court affirmed a conviction in spite of the trial judge’s restriction of cross-examination concerning a witness’ sexually abusive behavior. Conceding that the existence of such behavior would support the defense’s claim that the witness *230 was actually the perpetrator of the crime, the court nonetheless deemed the matter collateral and upheld the trial judge’s ruling.

Bright’s counsel engaged in substantial cross-examination on a collateral matter. In our view, that is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

AFFIRMED.

. The relevant portion of Shank’s cross-examination is as follows:

. Moreover, Bright himself testified about Todd’s violent behavior. Over prosecutorial objection, he described Todd's participation in incidents of rape, robbery, and kidnapping. Cross-examination of Shank concerning these acts would, therefore, only have produced corroborative character evidence.