facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi

Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1994) (setting forth elements of civil

conspiracy); Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 203 (Cal. 1991) (if a

plaintiff seeks to recover for emotional distress as the result of injuries to another,

the cause of action is limited to the most extreme cases of violent attack); see also

Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-4.

The district court properly dismissed Chipman’s claims against defendant

Judge Roberts as barred by judicial immunity because Judge Roberts’s challenged

actions were taken in her judicial capacity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12

(1991) (discussing judicial immunity and its limited exceptions).

The district court properly dismissed Chipman’s false imprisonment claim

because she failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that any restraint was

3 18-16879 without lawful privilege. See Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264 Cal.

Rptr. 640, 643 (Ct. App. 1989) (the tort of false imprisonment requires

confinement of person “without lawful privilege” (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chipman’s motion

for reconsideration because Chipman failed to establish any basis for relief. See

Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth requirements for reconsideration).

However, the district court granted summary judgment on Chipman’s

wrongful death claim against defendant Dr. Matthews and Enloe Medical Center

(“EMC”) because it found Chipman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether Dr. Matthews’ actions were a cause in fact of her mother’s

death. We disagree. The declaration submitted by Chipman’s expert Dr.

Mazzarella stated that “the death of [decedent] was largely iatrogenic, due to a

serious lack of knowledge of current medical standards on the part of the treating

physicians/institution.” Drawing all reasonable inferences in Chipman’s favor,

there is a potential genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant

Matthews’s treatment was a cause in fact of decedent’s death. We vacate and

remand only as to the grant of summary judgment on Chipman’s wrongful death

claim against Dr. Matthews and EMC.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

4 18-16879 in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); Acosta–

Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by

argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

Appellees Matthews and EMC shall bear their own costs on appeal. The

remainder of the costs are taxed against Appellant Chipman.

5 18-16879