facts to show that “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for

his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly

situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or

other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an

inference of discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603

(9th Cir. 2004). The first three prongs of the disparate treatment standard are not

disputed.

Even accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in

the light most favorable to Sheets, In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049,

1055 (9th Cir. 2008), Sheets’s allegations do not satisfy prong four. To meet Title

VII’s “similarly situated” requirement, Sheets must demonstrate that he was

similar to his proposed comparator “in all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447

F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006). Sheets stated only that he was terminated after

committing an unnamed willful policy violation, but a white officer, Andrew

Shipley, was not terminated after committing several alleged policy violations.

Sheets did not describe the willful policy violation of which he was accused in

either his First or Second Amended Complaint, or in his opening or reply brief.

3 Though Sheets provided significant factual detail regarding his comparator’s

violations, Sheets’s SAC alleged no facts indicating the circumstances around his

own policy violation. Thus, on the face of the operative complaint, a court would

be unable to determine whether Sheets’s alleged violation was of “comparable

seriousness” to Shipley’s alleged violations. See Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the district court did not

err in finding that Sheets’s allegations do not “plausibly suggest an entitlement to

relief.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. The district court also did not err by dismissing Sheets’s SAC with

prejudice. We review denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.

Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). A

district court may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue

of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Id. (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). Here, the district court denied leave to amend because

Sheets failed to cure the deficiencies the court had identified in dismissing his First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The district court noted that Sheets did not provide

more details between the FAC and SAC regarding whether Sheets and Shipley

were “similarly situated” other than identifying his proposed white comparator by

4 name and noting that Shipley was also an officer. The district court found the lack

of detail significant in part because it had earlier—in dismissing the FAC—

explained the applicable legal framework for plausibly alleging a race-based

disparate treatment claim under Title VII.1 See Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d

880, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, in Sheets’s response to the motion to

dismiss before the district court, he acknowledged that meeting the “similarly

situated” prong requires evidence that the comparators “engaged in the same

conduct.”

Given Sheets’s numerous opportunities to provide the necessary factual

allegations to support his disparate treatment theory, the district court did not abuse

its discretion by denying Sheets a third opportunity to amend.

AFFIRMED.

1 And on this appeal, despite the district court’s statement that “the SAC does not identify Plaintiff’s alleged violation, a detail that is crucial to raising an inference that he and Shipley were similarly situated,” Sheets declined to provide that information until oral argument.

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