with whom Circuit Judge CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL joins, concurring:

I join the court’s opinion because it correctly applies the law of this circuit to the case before us. 1 I fear, however, that requiring the district judge to recite a formal litany before allowing a defendant to exercise his right to self-representation creates unwarranted procedural snares for already busy district courts and unduly burdens the very rights guaranteed by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

District courts are well aware of their duty under Faretta to make sure that a defendant who wants to represent himself “ ‘knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236, 242 , 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). District judges deal with criminal defendants every day. They are in the best position to evaluate whether the defendant’s decision is made knowingly and intelligently: They can consider the level of understanding demonstrated by the defendant, his background and prior experience with the legal system, the deliberation with which he has made the decision to proceed without counsel and his seriousness of purpose. We ought to give a district judge’s determination greater deference and rely far less on rote recitation of mechanical formulas. 2

I am also concerned that requiring judge and defendant to engage in a verbal minuet may, in many cases, unduly inhibit the defendant from exercising his rights under Faretta . We must not lose sight of the fact that “[t]he right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-20 , 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34 . What inquiry is to be made and the degree to which it should be pressed is a matter best left to the district judge. Criminal defendants may construe a detailed enumeration of the dangers and pitfalls of proceeding without counsel as a *1491 warning that, if they choose to represent themselves anyway, the court will be disposed against them. Criminal proceedings are inherently intimidating and, despite the careful efforts of district judges, defendants may well perceive a formal litany by the district court as a veiled threat. We should allow district judges to dispense with all or part of the litany whenever they see good reason for doing so.

Appellate judges are fond of inventing formulas, tests and rules to constrain trial courts. Unable to participate in trial litigation directly, they gaze upon it with suspicion from a distance — a height, some would insist. The realities of the courtroom — the dozens of details that a district judge is able to absorb, assimilate and consider — escape appellate scrutiny simply because the reporter can capture only the words spoken, not the inflection with which they are delivered or the look (or absence thereof) that may accompany them. Consigned to watching the courtroom’s dramas flicker by like shadows on a cave wall, appellate judges are wont to seek clarity by forcing the actors to take exaggerated, stylized steps that leave images sufficiently distinctive to be examined and reviewed on a cold record.

This faith in procedural choreography is, in my view, fundamentally flawed. Appellate courts cannot foresee all contingencies; they cannot reduce every conceivable factor to a neat formula, nor anticipate every factual nuance a district judge might grasp by being there, able to hear, speak and observe. Nor can procedural incantations fulfill the lofty aspirations appellate judges have for them. A colloquy conducted in a rote and mechanical fashion, like a Miranda warning given in a disinterested tone, may look reassuring on the record but will do little to protect the rights of the accused. And, ritual has its costs; it is inflexible by nature and may as often defeat the ends it is designed to advance as serve them.

Appellate judges should be aware of their limitations. They can guide and review, but they cannot run the show. The task of safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants ultimately rests with the experienced men and women who preside in our district courts. , We should let them do their jobs.

. Our cases hold that the district court must discuss with the defendant on the record the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties and the dangers of self-representation. United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1005 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 , 104 S.Ct. 2398 , 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984); United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.1982). Absent a formal discussion specifically including each of these three elements, "it is [the] unusual case" where we can affirm the district court's grant of a criminal defendant’s motion to represent himself. Rylander, 714 F.2d at 1005 .

. Nothing in the record — other than the failure to recite the proper litany — calls into question the learned district judge’s conclusion that Ba-lough knowingly and intelligently exercised his rights under Faretta .