concurring in the result.

I concur in the result, but only for the following reasons.

In this RICO case, my panel colleagues have made thorough and conscientious efforts. RICO is for me (and many, if not most, of my district court colleagues) an agonizingly difficult and confusing area of *197 the law. Only with the greatest reluctance do I concur in the result here. My less than enthusiastic support stems from a general resistance to further the extension of civil RICO.

This case illustrates that extension through the continued federalization of state common law remedies. Dierdorff’s alleged kickback scheme simply amounted to fraud until it began to be exposed, as it unraveled. Dierdorff (in whose head, presumably, there were dancing visions of profits from his alleged shabby scheme, rather than visions of the arcane nuances of RICO) provided Sun with colorable grounds for RICO’s civil treble damages by sending four letters in which he sought to deny his wrongdoing to entities other than Sun. Thus Dierdorff s predicate acts, arguably committed after the fact and certainly not essential to the scheme, provide the bridge between common law fraud and RICO.

Unfortunately, the amorphous nature of the RICO act and its ill-defined terminology (“pattern” etc.) found therein, leave this court with minimal means of restraint. Sedima 1 leaves lower courts with almost no choice. Post-Sedima opinions in general, end up extending, rather than restricting RICO’s reach. Until congress circumscribes the legislation with somewhat more preciseness, RICO’s extension will probably continue. Thus I share the sentiments expressed by Judge Kennedy in his concurrence in Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 at 1402 (9th Cir.1986).

. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 , IOS S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985).