dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the majority’s opinion. While I agree that Brink, because it withdrew WLC’s authority to bargain on its behalf, was not bound by the 1983-85 master agreement, I cannot agree that Brink’s obligations under the 1981-83 master agreement were terminated.

Brink, by its letter of assent, bound itself to the terms of the 1981-83 master agreement. Brink’s letter of December 14,1982, withdrew only WLC’s authority to bargain on Brink’s behalf, it did not repudiate Brink’s obligations under the existing agreement. No one disputes that Brink continued to be bound by the 1981-83 *216 agreement after December 14. Because WLC no longer represented Brink, any action taken by WLC subsequent to December 14 could not affect Brink’s obligations under the 1981-83 agreement. By terminating WLC’s authority to act as its agent without concurrently repudiating the master agreement, Brink became a party to that agreement and was obligated to deal directly with the Union. If it wished to terminate the agreement it was required to follow the termination procedures spelled out in the agreement.

The majority finds that the 1981-83 agreement “terminated under its own terms on May 31, 1983.” See supra at 215. It is clear, however, that the agreement could not “terminate on its own terms.” On its own terms, the agreement was automatically renewed absent affirmative steps taken to prevent such renewal. It is true that WLC and the union negotiated a new agreement for 1983-85. However, after December 14, 1982, WLC’s actions had no legal effect on Brink. It is inconsistent to find that WLC had the power to terminate the agreement as to Brink but did not have the power to bind Brink to the 1983-85 master agreement. Once Brink had withdrawn its letter of assent, while leaving its obligations under the master agreement intact, it was required to comply with the notice provisions of the master agreement. Because Brink did not give timely notice of its intent to terminate, the 1981-83 agreement was renewed automatically. 1

Accordingly, I would hold that the district court properly granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment.

. The Union's initial response to Brink’s refusal to comply with the terms of the master agreement, appears inconsistent with the Union's claim before the district court that Brink was bound by the 1981-83 agreement. First the Union tried to negotiate a new letter of assent or individual agreement; it then claimed that Brink was bound by the 1983-85 agreement. See supra at 210. The fact that the Union may not have realized the continuing nature of Brink's obligations under the 1981-83 agreement at the outset does not, however, serve to excuse Brink. One does not lose legal rights by failing to recognize them or enforce them at the first possible opportunity.