dissenting.

The court correctly applies the law of the circuit pertaining to border searches and I *864 therefore reluctantly join its opinion. 1 However, the court stops short in failing to consider the reasonableness of the search, a necessary further inquiry when defendant has challenged the search on fourth amendment grounds. 2 Although 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (b) (Supp. Ill 1985) authorized the government to search Nates’ luggage without a warrant or probable cause, the statute did not and could not exempt the search from the one irreducible requirement of the fourth amendment, the requirement of reasonableness. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 , 105 S.Ct. 733, 741 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 , 51 S.Ct. 153, 158 , 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931); United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir.1970). The record here raises very serious doubts about whether the search was reasonable. I would therefore reverse or, at the very least, remand for the district court to consider the issue.

Introduction

What I find intensely disquieting about this case is the thorough, widespread and intrusive search that culminated in Nates’ arrest. Pursuant to official policy, customs agents inspecting the luggage on Avianca flight no. 81 selected a number of suitcases they thought looked suspicious and, using passkeys, opened the suitcases and searched through them. These searches were conducted outside the presence of the passengers and without their knowledge or consent.

Nates’ suitcase contained an unusually large amount of currency, which led the officers to confront Nates and, eventually, arrest him. We therefore know a good deal about this particular search. What we don’t know much about are the searches conducted of other people’s luggage, except that the number of other bags opened and searched at that time was probably on the order of two dozen. 3 We also don’t know precisely how many suitcases are opened and searched every day without the knowledge or consent of their owners, but the number appears to be very substantial. In a case recently decided by the Eleventh Circuit, the record disclosed that in a seven-month period during 1985, a single customs agent surreptitiously “opened about 50,000 suitcases.” United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126 , 1130 n. 16 (11th Cir.1987); id. at 1139 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). If this rate is typical, it would amount to about 100,000 bags opened per agent per year. Assuming that the customs service assigns even a modest number of agents to this task, the number of surreptitious intrusions into the property and privacy of travelers is potentially staggering. It is a matter that should give us serious pause lest we overlook, and implicitly approve, what may amount to wholesale violations of the fourth amendment rights of the traveling public.

Discussion

I.

There is no precise formula for what constitutes a reasonable search under the fourth amendment. The Constitution strikes a delicate balance between the state’s legitimate interest in detecting and preventing criminal activity and the individ *865 ual’s right to property, privacy and dignity. As the Supreme Court has often noted:

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 , 105 S.Ct. at 741 .

A secret search is, perhaps, the hardest to justify in light of our shared notions of individual privacy and personal autonomy. Clandestine searches are, by and large, foreign to our way of thinking because of their inherent intrusiveness, the heightened risk of abuse they pose, and because they are inconsistent with principles of openness and fair play we normally expect of our public officials. The notion that, while an individual is temporarily separated from his property, law enforcement officers are rummaging through it at will, is difficult to square with contemporary notions of what is reasonable governmental conduct.

Because secret searches are so unusual in our national experience, there is little law on the subject. But such law as there is reflects our discomfort with such proce-

dures. For example, the infamous writs of assistance of the eighteenth century, universally decried as infringements on personal liberties, nonetheless “required that notice be given before entry was made____” 2 W. LaFave, Search and Sei-

zure § 4.8(a), at 271 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 Yale L.J. 139 , 145 (1970)). More recently, the federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., allow secret intrusions into our privacy only with great reluctance, for the most compelling reasons and subject to the closest judicial scrutiny. 4 While these statutes have no direct application here, I believe they fairly reflect our collective discomfort with surreptitious governmental intrusions into our privacy.

II.

A.

There are three aspects of the search here in question that, alone or in combination, render it unreasonable under the fourth amendment. First, the search was conducted without notice and therefore the passengers on Avianca flight no. 81 were “not given a reasonable opportunity to surrender their privacy voluntarily.” 2 W. LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d)-(f), at 278 (2d ed. 1987) (“LaFave”). The requirement that notice be given before a search is conducted is of ancient origin 5 and has become deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. 6 *866 While a search conducted without notice may nonetheless be proper, notice clearly bears on the question of reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom., Lizarraga v. United States, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979). In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 , 87 S.Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), for example, the Court struck down a state eavesdropping statute on the grounds, inter alia, that it “has no requirement for notice ... nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some showing of special facts.” Id. at 60 , 87 S.Ct. at 1884. If there is no persuasive justification for failing to give notice, such failure can itself render the search unreasonable. See generally 2 W. LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d)-(f), at 280-87 (2d ed. 1987).

Here, there is no indication that signs were posted or that passengers were otherwise advised that agents would be rummaging through their personal possessions. 7 Moreover, because, as Judge Norris noted in Des Jardins, “exit searches are quite uncommon” in the United States, 747 F.2d at 504, passengers have no expectation or common understanding that they may suffer a fairly serious intrusion into their privacy as a condition for leaving the country. Indeed, given the above-board procedure employed in entry searches, where passengers are required to line up with their luggage for spot-checks by customs agents, travelers can reasonably infer from the absence of such procedure that no exit checks are conducted. My guess is that most passengers would be shocked to learn that, as they are waiting to board the plane, faceless bureaucrats are breaking into their luggage and pawing through it at will.

I suppose it is possible that there were good reasons for searching the luggage on Avianca flight no. 81 without notice to the passengers. But any such reason would have to be carefully documented and would probably only be valid as to that flight. I rather doubt that the policy of secret searches can be justified in the abstract to cover all passengers on all flights leaving the United States. In any event, justification there would have to be; I don’t think that the practice of searching luggage without notice is so inherently reasonable that we could approve it without justification.

Second, the search was conducted outside the passengers’ presence. This infringes a variety of privacy and property interests. Luggage is the little bit of home we take with us when we travel. As the Supreme Court has noted,

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 , 105 S.Ct. at 741 . In a very real sense, luggage is as private — and as vulnerable to intrusion — as is our place of abode. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11, 13 , 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2483, 2484-85 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 , 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). Passengers often carry with them “such ... highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries,” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 , 105 S.Ct. at 742 , that they would be uncomfortable to have others gawk at. If the search is conducted in the passengers’ presence, they may be able to cover up or partially conceal such items to avoid unwarranted scrutiny. When the search is conducted in secret, the passengers have no way of avoiding unjustified examination of private items that may become the butt *867 of jokes or allusions by the personnel conducting the search.

On a more mundane level, when the search is conducted outside the passengers’ presence, they are unable to protect the physical security or integrity of their possessions. Thus, bags might be damaged when they are forced open, or their contents might be broken, lost or stolen. When passengers are present during the search, they can minimize the risk by opening suitcases themselves and alerting the agents about any items that may be subject to damage. Also, they can witness any mishap and hold the agent responsible. Agents, for their part, may be more careful if passengers are watching. While we trust our federal agents to be careful and honest, we also know that perfection is rare to find and difficult to maintain. The fact of the matter is, when agents secretly break into people’s suitcases and search through them by the hundreds of thousands, occasionally something will go wrong — someone will be tempted, or careless, or even do something that seems perfectly reasonable yet causes damage, such as opening a canister of undeveloped film.

Finally, there is a separate intrusion because passengers whose luggage is searched are generally never told about it. This means that when something is lost, stolen, mislaid or broken, the passenger will be completely mystified as to what happened. He will have no idea where to inquire as to its whereabouts or demand compensation. He may spend countless hours looking for the item in places he might have left it, harassing people who might have taken it, never suspecting that a government agent used a passkey to go through his luggage. Being subject to a secret search and then never being told about it is something I think most people would find especially offensive, and this then bears on the reasonableness of the procedure employed by the government.

B.

All of this might be beside the point if there were no reasonably available alternatives. But there clearly are. For one thing, there is no apparent reason why passengers cannot be advised that their luggage may or will be searched before it leaves the country. Customs agents put up signs and make public announcements advising passengers of their duty to report currency over $5,000. The same methods could be employed to advise passengers that government agents might be searching through their luggage before it is put on the plane. Alternatively, agents might first inspect the luggage and identify pieces that look suspicious. Passengers could then be reunited with their luggage and given an opportunity to open the suitcases for inspection. 8 Finally, if it turns out that the search must be conducted secretly, there is no self-evident reason why passengers whose luggage has been searched cannot be advised of the fact afterward and given a chance to make sure everything is in order.

One simple way of handling the matter would be for passengers to exit the country through customs — with occasional spot checks — much as they do when entering. A number of other countries have routine exit checks and, while somewhat intrusive, they certainly seem like a straightforward and effective way of implementing the congressional mandate embodied in 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (b).

To be sure, from the point of view of law enforcement authorities, such a procedure may have disadvantages. But the same can be said of the Bill of Rights. As Justice Black noted,

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 , 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1229 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (plurality opinion). The relevant question is not whether law enforcement officers have selected the best available method but whether alternatives are available that more equitably balance the interests of law enforcement with the individual rights of citizens. Cf . Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (“the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available”). If reasonable alternatives are available, that alone renders the government’s actions unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. 9

One final consideration. The alternatives I have suggested would give exit searches far more visibility than they now receive. This would expose the practice to the political process, an important safeguard against arbitrary government action. I, for one, would feel far more comfortable with the procedure here employed if I were convinced that the public was aware of it and generally approved. It may be that the government’s reluctance to advise passengers of these searches is motivated in part by a fear that, if widely known, the practice would not be tolerated. I am reluctant to help the government maintain this secret.

Conclusion

Many decisions of this court and the Supreme Court have given force to Justice Brandéis’ declaration in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 , 48 S.Ct. 564 , 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), that the framers of the Constitution “conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Id. at 478 , 48 S.Ct. at 572 (Brandéis, J., dissenting). “To protect that right,” declared Brandéis, “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. This fundamental principle is of no less force when it is the individual’s personal luggage that is at issue. For it is clear that the individual’s realm of privacy includes his possessions as well as his person, his duffle bag as well as his dwelling. See, e.g., Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11, 13 , 97 S.Ct. at 2483, 2484-85 .

The search here did not comport with these principles. I must therefore respectfully dissent.

. My reluctance is based largely on the misgivings expressed in United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 503-04 (9th Cir.1984).

. My colleagues' failure to address the issue is understandable given that defendant did not raise this precise argument here or below. Nevertheless, defendant objected to the search on fourth amendment grounds; this makes the issue one we may (but admittedly need not) address. Our responsibility to defendant, and to the traveling public — the true victim of the search here — militates in favor of considering the issue.

. At the suppression hearing, agent Miramontes testified that he searched the luggage for Avian-ca flight no. 81 on April 29, 1986, together with three other officers. He himself examined about twelve pieces of luggage, of which he opened six. Reporter’s Transcript at 18-22. He was not aware of how many bags his colleagues opened but, presumably, the number was somewhat similar.

. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, for example, provides that the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize wiretaps without a court order in limited circumstances involving foreign communications. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (a)(1) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). In addition, the Attorney’ General may authorize wiretaps for a set time if he simultaneously gives notice to the specially-constituted court. Id. at § 1805(e). Otherwise, wiretaps must be approved by that court in advance, id. § 1803, and only upon a proper showing of necessity and subject to appropriate minimization procedures designed to protect the privacy of innocent third parties whose conversations are overheard by authorized surveillance. Id. §§ 1801(h), 1804-06. Moreover, even if the surveillance is authorized by the court, a person aggrieved by the wiretap may challenge it in a United States district court. See United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir.1987).

. In all cases where the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party’s house, ... if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the doors____

Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke 91a, 91b, 77 Eng.Rep. 185, 186-87 (K.B. 1603).

. In Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 , 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1758 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), a case which involved an interpretation of the federal notice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 , the Court noted the "values inherent in" the notice requirement, values that center around the individual’s interest in privacy and security from government intru *866 sion. See also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); Munoz v. United States, 325 F.2d 23 (9th Cir.1963). See generally 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 4.8(b), at 273-77 (2d ed. 1987).

. While the record is not entirely clear on this point, the absence of notice can be inferred from the fact that Nates was not aware that his luggage had been searched when he was confronted, by the customs agents. If there is a doubt on this point, it could easily be resolved on remand.

. This would no doubt prevent customs agents from trapping suspects into false statements, as they did here. But I am not convinced that putting suspects in a position where they are likely to commit a separate offense is a governmental interest that ought to carry much weight with us in determining reasonableness.

. The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 , 97 S.Ct. 1972 , 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977), does not render the search here per se constitutional. Justice Powell expressed the limited precedental effect of the majority opinion: "On the understanding that the precedental effect of today’s decision does not go beyond the validity of mail searches at the border pursuant to the statute, I ... join the opinion of the Court." Id. 431 U.S. at 625 , 97 S.Ct. at 1983. Ramsey deals with materials coming into the country, a point emphasized repeatedly by the Court. Id. at 612, 616, 619, 620, 623 , 97 S.Ct. at 1976, 1978-79, 1980, 1980-81, 1982. The fact bears heavily on people's expectation that the materials will be subject to search. Moreover, Ramsey involved a search (but not reading) of the contents of envelopes. The likelihood of intrusion is far less where one is dealing with the nonwritten contents of an envelope then with the contents of a suitcase. Finally, in Ramsey there were no reasonably available alternatives. Upon entering the country, the mail was searched at the General Post Office in New York City, far from its ultimate destination. Id. at 609 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. at 1975 n. 2. Obtaining the consent or participation of the addressee would have been quite burdensome.