facts show a violation of a constitutional right and (ii) the constitutional right was

clearly established at the time of the violation. Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969

F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2020). A right is clearly established if the state of the law

at the time of the adverse action gave the officers fair warning that their conduct

was unconstitutional. Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir.

2013). “[I]n an obvious case, [general] standards can ‘clearly establish’ the

3 answer, even without a body of relevant case law.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.

194, 199 (2004).

The Officers raise three issues in this appeal. First, the Officers argue that

they are entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to continue detaining

McCall solely so that The D could issue him a trespass warning. We disagree.

It was clearly established in 2017 that a Terry-stop detainee must

immediately be released once the investigation fails to elicit probable cause to

arrest. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (holding that a Terry stop “must

be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

stop”). It was also clearly established that police officers have no authority to

detain someone solely to issue a civil trespass warning (or to allow a private entity

to issue a civil trespass warning). Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir.

2016) (“[T]he officer must have reasonable suspicion ‘the person apprehended is

committing or has committed a criminal offense.’” (emphasis added) (quoting

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009))). So, once Jacobitz told McCall

that the Officers had “nothing” on him regarding any drug activity, the Officers

needed a separate constitutional basis for further detention. The D’s private

interest in issuing McCall a trespass warning is no such authority—trespass

warnings are not criminal in nature.

Second, Jacobitz and Muenzenmeyer argue that they are entitled to qualified

4 immunity for their decision (i) to place McCall in handcuffs at the inception of the

stop and (ii) to continue handcuffing him for the remainder of the stop. Their

arguments are unpersuasive. We recognize that it is sometimes appropriate for

police officers to handcuff a Terry-stop detainee (say, for police safety). However,

“‘handcuffing . . . is not part of a typical Terry stop’” and requires “special

circumstances.” Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982)). Based on

the facts presented—which we view in the light most favorable to McCall, see

Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 946—handcuffing McCall was inappropriate and violated

clearly established law. See Washington, 98 F.3d at 1192; Meredith v. Erath, 342

F.3d 1057, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2003).

Third, Hafen and Ramirez-Marillo argue that they were not “integral

participants” of any illegal detention or handcuffing upon their return with The D’s

security team. We disagree. Hafen and Ramirez-Marillo brought The D’s security

team over to where McCall was detained so that the security team could decide if

they wanted to issue him a trespass warning. And neither Hafen nor Ramirez-

Marillo uncuffed McCall until he was finally issued a trespass warning. So, Hafen

and Ramirez-Marillo were more than “mere bystanders.” Bravo v. City of Santa

Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.

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