United States v. Pierre Fouche

833 F.2d 1284 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pierre FOUCHE, Defendant-Appellant. No. 86-5157. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Feb. 2, 1987. Decided April 9, 1987. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Dec. 15, 1987. Enrique Romero, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Carlton F. Gunn, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before FERGUSON, NELSON and BEEZER, Circuit Judges. NELSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Pierre Fouche appeals his conviction on two counts of unarmed bank robbery, under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113 (a) (1982). He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress a confession that was allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We hold that the government agent's questions were fairly designed to clarify Fouche's equivocal request for counsel and that Fouche made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Since Fouche has made no claim that the confession was otherwise involuntary, we conclude that the confession was properly admitted into evidence at trial. We affirm. 2 *…

Pierre Fouche appeals his conviction on two counts of unarmed bank robbery, under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) (1982). He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress a confession that was allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We hold that the government agent’s questions were fairly designed to clarify Fouche’s equivocal request for counsel and that Fouche made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Since Fouche has made no claim that the confession was otherwise involuntary, we conclude that the confession was properly admitted into evidence at trial. We affirm.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal comes before us for the second time. Fouche originally filed a motion to suppress his confession in June, 1984, before trial. He contended that his interrogators failed to clarify his equivocal request for counsel before obtaining his confession, thereby violating his Miranda rights. The district court denied the motion and in October 1984 Fouche was convicted on two counts of unarmed bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a). Fouche appealed. 1 We remanded to the district court for further findings of fact, to…

dissenting:

In United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir.1985) [Fouche I], this court held that when a criminal suspect “makes an equivocal assertion of counsel the police must cease all questions except that they may attempt to clarify the suspect’s desire for counsel.” We concluded that interrogation could continue only if clarification revealed that the suspect did not want counsel. Id. at 1405 . We remanded the case to the district court for additional findings concerning Fouche’s and Agent Alba’s communications in light of this circuit’s newly adopted standard. The district court concluded that Agent Alba sufficiently clarified Fouche’s request for counsel and that the interrogation and confession that followed were legitimate. The majority now affirms. I dissent because the facts of this case do not support the majority’s conclusion under the standard set forth in Fouche I.

The majority concedes that Fouche’s statement that he “might want to talk to a lawyer” constitutes an equivocal request for counsel. Thus, the only question before us is whether Agent Alba sufficiently clarified Fouche’s request before proceeding with the interrogation. I submit that…