United States v. Richard W. Bogard

Richard Bogard alleges two errors as the basis for overturning convictions of attempted income tax evasion: denial of a motion to continue and a motion to inspect and copy jury selection materials. We affirm.

I. MOTION TO CONTINUE

Ten days before trial was scheduled to begin, and almost two months after his initial appearance, Bogard moved for a continuance. It was denied. He argues that the court abused its discretion because he was brought to trial in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(2), and because his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated.

1. Speedy Trial Act

The Speedy Trial Act provides:

18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(2). This section was intended to provide criminal defendants with adequate time to obtain counsel and to prepare for trial. See United States v. Adu, 770 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1030 , 106 S.Ct. 1235 , 89 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986). Although the start of the 30-day trial preparation period is defined clearly as the defendant’s first appearance through counsel, see United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 234 , 106 S.Ct. 555, 557 , 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985), we have not applied this test mechanically when…