Horowitz

INTRODUCTION

In this complex, multi-party case, one plaintiff firmly established that she had been the victim of financial elder abuse on a massive scale, but only some of the defendants were found liable for it. We enter the fray not to review the trial court’s findings on liability, but to unspool numerous statutes and doctrines pertaining to its posttrial rulings on cross-motions for attorney fees and costs. The primary threads on the spool, in our estimation, are three. First, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, which requires the trial court to award a successful elder abuse plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and costs.1 (Id. at subd. (a).) Second, Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, which entitles a statutorily-defined prevailing party to costs as a matter of right, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute[.]” (Id. at subd. (b).) And third, the equitable common fund and/or substantial benefit doctrines, especially as applied to Corporations Code section 15910.05, subdivision (b) to derivative actions on behalf of limited partnerships.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 The…