DISCUSSION

Mother contends that insufficient evidence supports the finding of substantial detriment to the child if returned to Mother’s care, and that the juvenile court erred when it terminated reunification services. We disagree. At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court must order the child returned to the parent “unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subds. (e)(1), (f)(1).) “The failure of the parent . . . to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(1), (f)(1)(B), 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A).) The court may continue the case for six additional months only if it finds “a substantial probability that the child will be returned . . . within the extended period of time” based on findings that (A) the parent “consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child,” (B) the parent “has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child’s removal from the home,” and (C) the parent “has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of [their] treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” (§366.21, subd. (g)(1).) We review the juvenile court’s determinations for substantial evidence. (J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20

4 Cal.App.5th 530, 535 [termination of services]; In re B.S. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 246, 252 [detriment finding].) We resolve all conflicts and inferences to uphold the decision and do not reweigh the evidence. (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) Substantial evidence established a risk of detriment to Y.V. and no likelihood she could be returned to Mother’s custody before the 18-month time limit expired. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A), 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) Mother lied about her relationship with Father, left Y.V.’s infant brother unsupervised with Father, transported the infant in a vehicle without restraints, and failed to take him to a medical appointment. Mother failed to benefit from the services provided, as evidenced by her limited participation in therapy and her failure to gain insight into safe parenting practices. Mother asserts the juvenile court should have continued reunification services because she had terminated her abusive relationship with Father. But substantial evidence established that notwithstanding her contrary statements, they planned to continue their relationship, and that it continued to pose a substantial risk to Y.V. Mother also failed to show that she had overcome her substance abuse problems. The court acknowledged the absence of drug use since October, but noted that she had shown a similar pattern in the past, and had not demonstrated that she had the necessary “sober support in place” to avoid future substance abuse. Mother argues that the information provided to the court by the Human Services Agency was “incomplete.” She attached several exhibits of “updated information” to her petition, some of which were not before the juvenile court. But we cannot

5 consider documents outside the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(b)(1); In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413.) Mother requests that she be granted additional visitation. She has not shown that the juvenile court abused its discretion regarding visitation. (§ 366.21, subd. (h); In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.) Nor has she shown that the court abused its discretion when it placed Y.V. with relatives of Father rather than with the maternal grandmother. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1569.) In summary, substantial evidence established that Mother’s substance abuse and abusive relationship with Father continued to place Y.V. at risk. Mother failed to show sufficient progress in treatment to warrant additional reunification services. “[I]n order to prevent children from spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.) The juvenile court did not err when it terminated services and set the case for a section 366.26 hearing.

DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. The request for a stay of the section 366.26 proceedings is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. PERREN, J.

6 Tari L. Cody, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

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DRE and Hannah Gray for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Linda Stevenson, Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.